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Foreword by Molly Scott Cato MEP
 
Facebook is the social network turned antisocial network. It was supposed to 
bring us closer together but now stands accused of stealing our imaginations, 
fostering social divisions, inciting self-harm and failing to control hate speech, 
extremism and pornography. Facebook has found a way to monetise humanity, 
extracting monetary value from our creativity. Far from being shared fairly for social 
good, this creativity has been enclosed, privatised and its value funnelled into the 
pockets of a small number of shareholders.
These are all serious accusations, but from the perspective of a parliamentarian, the 
most destructive singular impact of Facebook is its impact on democracy.
Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of this global information behemoth, famously used the 
mission statement ‘Move fast and break things’ to drive his company’s expansion. 
Unfortunately, one of the things that seems to have been broken is democracy itself. 
From voter suppression ads used during the 2016 US Presidential election, to the 
deceitful propaganda used to persuade British people to vote for Brexit, and on to the 
WhatsApp lies that enabled Bolsonaro to become president of Brazil, Facebook is being 
used to undermine democratic standards across the world. And, while actors on both 
the right and the left could be using Facebook for propaganda purposes, evidence is 
growing that this anti-social network has now become a major tool of the far right.
I was able to question Richard Allan, Facebook’s Vice President of Public Policy, when 
he gave evidence at the European Parliament inquiry into Facebook and Cambridge 
Analytica. Like Nick Clegg, who has since joined the company to brush up its image, 
Allan is a PR man, not a technical expert. He observed that ‘one person’s fake news is 
another person’s political speech’. This throwaway line demonstrates the dangerous 
level of complacency we are dealing with. As an information business, Facebook must 
understand that there is the world of difference between evidence-based policy-making 
and political propaganda. Perhaps we should not be surprised that Allan, as a PR man, 
cannot distinguish between the two.
In spite of repeated pleas that it can be trusted, it is clear that Facebook has neither the 
will nor the humility to reform itself. Regulation is overdue, and urgently so, in view of 
the fact that the UK may soon hold a People’s Vote and the whole of the EU will soon be 
holding elections to the European Parliament.
There is a vast array of evidence on the appalling and destructive behaviour of 
Facebook, but I am delighted that in this report Tom Scott has been able to summarise 
this information and make it accessible. The report also includes suggestions about 
how regulation might work. It is vital that policy-makers act swiftly on this issue. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the survival of our democracies depends on it.
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Executive summary
This report examines the role of Facebook in abuses of personal data for political 
purposes and the spread of disinformation in recent years – and particularly during the 
Brexit referendum campaign in 2016.  
It describes how the company has, from its earliest years, abused the trust placed in it by users 
of its platform and based its business model on the sharing of their personal data with third 
parties, with scant regard for the uses to which this data has been put. It also details the ways 
in which Facebook has consistently lied to the public and to regulators in order to conceal or 
misrepresent the ongoing abuses to which it has been party.
After giving a history of Facebook that describes how the company has come to occupy a 
massively dominant role in the social media landscape globally, the report summarises three 
recent inquiries that have shed light on such abuses: the inquiry into disinformation and fake 
news by the UK parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee; the investigation into 
the use of data analytics in political campaigns by the UK Information Commissioner’s Office; 
and the inquiry into abuses of personal data involving Facebook and Cambridge Analytica by 
the Canadian parliament’s Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. 
We also look at the testimony given by Mark Zuckerberg and other Facebook executives to EU 
parliamentarians in the summer of 2018, along with that of a number of expert witnesses. 
Each of these inquiries has shone a light on the ways in which Facebook has enabled shadowy 
political actors to micro-target voters with disinformation ahead of key votes, not least the 
UK’s Brexit referendum. They have also revealed the extent of Facebook’s dissembling about 
its role in these abuses, and the company’s determined efforts to resist transparency and 
accountability.
We conclude that Facebook cannot be trusted to regulate itself. To ensure that such abuses are 
curtailed in future, we offer a number of policy recommendations.
To ensure user data is better protected we propose:
• Coordination of data protection regulation across different national jurisdictions, using the 
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as a model framework and with sanctions 
that represent much more than the mere ‘cost of business’ for Facebook and other such 
companies;
•  Framing of regulations so that companies basing any part of their data operations in countries 
not covered by equivalent legislation are deemed to be automatically in breach. 
•  Specification by regulators of standard, simple and easily understandable privacy settings 
set by default to ‘no sharing of personal data with other organisations’.
To address the spread of disinformation and dishonest/covert political advertising, we propose 
that:
•  The EU make adherence to its new Code of Practice on Disinformation a legal requirement 
for social media firms, with heavy penalties for any breaches and for concealment of such 
breaches;
•  The Code itself be tightened up to define more precisely what is required of its signatories.
•  All signatories to the Code be required to place all political advertisements that run on their 
platforms in easily searchable databases to which both regulators and members of the 
public have access, including information on the sponsor of each ad, the amount spent on it 
and the basis on which any targeting was carried out.
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•  During political campaigns ahead of elections or referenda, all political advertising – whether 
from parties or non-party campaigning organisations – should be labelled as such and all 
such parties and campaigners should be required to register with Facebook and other social 
media platforms that they use.
•  Users of social media platforms should be easily able to opt out of all political advertising and 
an opt-out link enabling them to do this should be included prominently with all political ads.
•  Political advertising related to elections and referenda in particular countries but that 
originates from and/or is paid for by sources from outside these countries should be banned 
under the Code.
•  The Code be amended to specify clear requirements on identity verification and the prohibition 
of automated posts by non-human agents.
•  Personal social media accounts should always be clearly linked to accountable people, who 
should be limited in the number of such accounts they can hold. Organisational and group 
pages should be linked to legally founded organisations or associations with responsible 
(named) people behind them. 
To curb Facebook’s monopoly power and foster a healthier social media ecosystem, we propose 
that:
•  Users of social media networks be treated as core stakeholders who should be meaningfully 
represented both in the ownership of the network and at board level. This could also 
potentially be a requirement of an internationally applied code of practice
•  National governments, including that of the UK, set up dedicated regulatory bodies equivalent 
to existing regulators that oversee the behaviour of the print and broadcast media and the 
energy utility industries. Such bodies should be responsible for ensuring that platforms 
adhere to regulations and codes of practice, with powers to impose heavy fines for breaches 
and, ultimately, the power to withdraw an offending company’s licence to operate. 
•  Money raised from penalties imposed by regulators on companies such as Facebook should 
be earmarked for: 
 1)  fhe funding of organisations developing social media networks that take a transparent 
and responsible attitude to user data, and that are under the control of fully accountable 
trusts operated in the interests of users and employees, and 
 2) funding for regulatory bodies specifically tasked with the oversight of social media 
platforms, focusing on transparency, privacy and combating the spread of disinformation 
online. 
1  The Parliamentary Debates from 
the Year 1803 to the Present 
Time, Hansard, London, 1817
2  In December 2017, a survey by 
Pew Research Center found that 
only 32% of people in the UK 
placed trust in the news media; 
the average for the Western 
European countries surveyed was 
41%. See: ‘Trust in the military 
exceeds trust in other institutions 
in Western Europe and U.S.’, 
Courtney Johnson, Pew Research 
Center, 4 September 2018.
3  Yochai Benckler and Helen 
Nissenbaum, ‘Commons-based 
Peer Production and Virtue’, The 
Journal of Political Philosophy: 
Volume 14, Number 4, 2006.
4  ‘Parliamentarians from across 
the world sign declaration on the 
Principles of the Law Governing 
the Internet’, UK Parliament 
website, 27 November 2018.
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1.0  Introduction
‘With great power comes great responsibility.’ The first recorded instance of this phrase, 
or a close variant of it, was in 1817, when the British parliamentarian William Lamb 
reminded the press of:
‘… their duty to apply to themselves a maxim which they never neglected to urge on the 
consideration of government – “that the possession of great power necessarily implies great 
responsibility”. They stood in a high situation, and ought to consider justice and truth the great 
objects of their labours.’ 1
Anxiety at what has been seen as the grossly irresponsible behaviour from some elements of 
the media is not new, and has often been amply justified. Racism, sexism and distortion of the 
truth for the purposes of political propaganda has been evident in the tabloid press for years 
and – more recently – this tone and style has infected some of the mass broadcast media, 
where we have seen a decline in concern for truth and justice. The excesses of networks such 
as Fox News in the US and British newspapers such as The Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph and 
The Sun (not least during and after the Brexit referendum campaign) show that people have 
had good reason to distrust the long-established mass media and to regard much of its output 
with scepticism if not outright contempt.2 ‘Fake news’ may be a recent coinage, but it is not a 
recent invention.
But as distrust of the ‘mainstream media’ has grown, so too has the power of a new and highly 
pervasive form of communication: so-called ‘social’ media.
The start of the new millennium saw a wave of optimism that these new media could be a 
powerfully democratising force, and that by bypassing the entrenched power structures of the 
established media they could help open up space for voices that would otherwise go unheard. 
This optimism was tied up with the emerging notion of a ‘sharing economy’. In an influential 
article of 2006, Yochai Benkler and Helen Nissenbaum framed this as ‘commons-based peer 
production’,  in which large numbers of people would use the Internet cooperatively ‘to provide 
information, knowledge or cultural goods without relying on either market pricing or managerial 
hierarchies to coordinate their common enterprise.’3 Social media, which enabled anyone to 
create content and to share it online with others in their networks for free, seemed to many to 
provide a wonderful set of tools with which to build this utopian vision.   
Fast forward to November 2018, when parliamentarians from around the world convened in 
London to form an International Grand Committee on Disinformation and Fake News. On 27 
November the committee’s members, which included representatives from Argentina, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, France, Ireland, Latvia, Singapore and the UK, signed a Declaration on the 
Principles of the Law Governing the Internet. Its preamble noted that:
‘…it is an urgent and critical priority for legislatures and governments to ensure that the 
fundamental rights and safeguards of their citizens are not violated or undermined by the 
unchecked march of technology; the democratic world order is suffering a crisis of trust from 
the growth of disinformation, the proliferation of online aggression and hate speech, concerted 
attacks on our common democratic values of tolerance and respect for the views of others, and 
the widespread misuse of data belonging to citizens to enable these attempts to sabotage open 
and democratic processes, including elections.’4
The declaration clearly spelled out the threat to democracy from ‘aggressive campaigns of 
disinformation launched from one country against citizens in another, and the coordinated 
activity of fake accounts using data-targeting methods to try manipulate the information that 
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people see on social media’. It called for the creation of a ‘system of global internet governance 
that can serve to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of generations to come, based 
on established codes of conduct for agencies working for nation states, and govern the major 
international tech platforms which have created the systems that serve online content to billions 
of users around the world’.
Even as the Grand Committee was deliberating, the destructive power of fake news spread by 
social media was dramatically illustrated once again when the so-called Gilets Jaunes (Yellow 
Jackets) unleashed a wave of mob violence on the streets of Paris and other French cities. 
Their actions had been organised almost entirely via Facebook pages, and the inchoate anger 
that fuelled them had been stoked in large part via fake news in the form of memes and viral 
videos.5
5  ’The ‘Yellow Jackets’ Riots In 
France Are What Happens When 
Facebook Gets Involved With 
Local News’, Ryan Broderick, 
Buzzfeed News, 5 December 
2018.
6  ‘Upended by frat boys: 
International lawmakers slam 
Facebook’s effect on politics’, 
Alistair Smout, Reuters, 27 
November 2018.
A protestor of the ‘Gele Vestjes’(Yellow jackets) 
denouncing the NOS news broadcasting channel as 
‘Fake news’ in the city of Groningen.  
Wikimedia Commons/Donald Trung
As noted above, ‘fake news’ and propaganda are 
in themselves nothing new. What is new, and 
extraordinarily dangerous, is the way in which 
weaponised lies and disinformation can be 
disseminated at tremendous speed and targeted 
with great precision on groups and individuals 
who are most likely to be susceptible to them. 
What’s more, this sort of activity is much less 
visible than propaganda disseminated via more 
traditional media channels, because of the way in 
which it is distributed at an individual level, out of 
public view and often by actors who are not what 
they claim to be.
As this report will show, one social media 
company has played a central role in the rise of 
this insidious threat to democracy, while greatly 
enriching its owners and investors in the process: 
Facebook, Inc.  
On the same day the Grand Committee issued 
its declaration, its members had an opportunity 
to address questions about Facebook’s role to 
the company’s Vice President of Policy Solutions, 
Richard Allan. His answers ranged from the 
anodyne and uninformative to the evasive and 
misleading. But perhaps more significant than anything Allan had to say was an empty place 
at the table in the committee’s meeting room – a place labelled with the name of Facebook’s 
co-founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg.
Despite repeated requests from the UK parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 
Committee, which had convened the international gathering of parliamentarians, Zuckerberg 
had refused to appear in person to answer questions on the abuses his platform had facilitated. 
As Canadian lawmaker Charlie Angus observed: ‘We’ve never seen anything quite like Facebook, 
where, while we were playing on our phones and apps, our democratic institutions ... seem to 
have been upended by frat-boy billionaires from California. So Mr Zuckerberg’s decision not to 
appear here at Westminster (Britain’s parliament) to me speaks volumes’.6
What had happened to turn the utopian vision of social media as a force for positive collaboration 
and democratic empowerment into a dystopian nightmare of industrialised hate-speech and 
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divisive propaganda? And what can be done to hold to account the corporation that more than 
any other has enabled this, and to prevent further damage to our democratic processes and 
institutions? These are the questions examined in this report. 
It starts by describing Facebook’s rise to global dominance in the social media sphere, 
showing how decisions made with a view to maximising the company’s market share and 
the monetisation of personal data can be directly linked to the abuses that have come to light 
recently. 
The next section of the report summarises a large body of evidence gathered by three inquiries 
that have looked into Facebook’s role in recent political events around the world: the inquiry 
into disinformation and fake news by the UK parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee; the investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns by the UK 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO); and the inquiry into abuses of personal data involving 
Facebook and Cambridge Analytica by the Canadian parliament’s Standing Committee on 
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. This section also covers the testimony given by Mark 
Zuckerberg and other Facebook executives to EU parliamentarians in the summer of 2018, 
along with that of a number of expert witnesses.
We conclude by proposing some recommendations aimed at making companies such as 
Facebook more accountable, at fostering more democratic models of ownership and control 
in the social media sphere, and at reviving some of the more positive possibilities that, just a 
few years ago, this had seemed to hold out. Given the possibility that we may be engaged in a 
second EU referendum within months, it is essential that proposals for legal changes as well as 
changes of corporate policy at Facebook are implemented swiftly and decisively.
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7  Thiel, who is still on Facebook’s 
board, was a major donor 
to Donald Trump’s election 
campaign and is reported to have 
assembled a Silicon Valley ‘brains 
trust’ to supply ideas to the 
Trump presidency. His company 
Palantir Technologies supplies 
big-data services to corporations, 
intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, and Palantir staff 
are said by whistleblower 
Christopher Wylie to have been 
frequent visitors to Cambridge 
Analytica’s London headquarters. 
Thiel is on record expressing 
the view that democracy and 
freedom (by which he means 
unfettered capitalism) are 
incompatible; see ‘Donald Trump, 
Peter Thiel and the death of 
democracy’, Ben Tarnoff, The 
Guardian, 21 July 2016.
8  ‘Well, These New Zuckerberg IMs 
Won’t Help Facebook’s Privacy 
Problems’, Nicholas Carlson, 
Business Insider, 13 May 2010.
2.0 Facebook’s rise to global dominance
2.1  ‘Move fast and break things’
At the same time as Harvard Professor Yochai Benkler was gestating his thoughts on 
commons-based peer production, a student at the same university was developing 
a very different take on social media – and one that was to make him, over the next 
decade, one of the world’s richest men.
In 2003, Mark Zuckerberg, a second-year Harvard student, wrote a programme he called 
‘Facemash’, which compiled photos of female Harvard students and invited users to choose 
which of these was ‘hotter’. It proved a hit with many male students but not with the university 
authorities, who charged Zuckerberg with offences including violation of individual privacy and 
copyright infringement. 
Zuckerberg, true to his later form, was undeterred. In 2004 he and three male collaborators 
launched ‘TheFacebook’, a website that functioned as a directory of students at Harvard and 
allowed them easily to contact each other. Within a month, more than half the undergraduates 
at Harvard had registered, and soon after the site was opened to students at other universities. 
More controversy followed the site’s launch, however, with Zuckerberg accused of having 
misappropriated the ideas of other Harvard students and put them to his own use (a case that 
was eventually settled out of court for $9.5 million in 2008). 
Zuckerberg was not slow to grasp the commercial possibilities of the site, and in 2004 he 
and entrepreneur Sean Parker (now president of the nascent corporation) moved to Palo Alto, 
California. They rapidly secured an infusion of venture capital from PayPal co-founder and 
right-wing libertarian, Peter Thiel.7
 
A  T E L L I N G  E X C H A N G E
 
Shortly after launching TheFacebook, Mark Zuckerberg had an instant messenger exchange 
with a college friend which showed an attitude to privacy that was to characterise Facebook’s 
approach to personal data over the next decade and a half.
 Zuck: Yeah so if you ever need info about anyone at Harvard
 Zuck: Just ask.
 Zuck: I have over 4,000 emails, pictures, addresses, SNS
 [Redacted Friend’s Name]: What? How’d you manage that one?
 Zuck: People just submitted it.
 Zuck: I don’t know why.
 Zuck: They ‘trust me’
 Zuck: Dumb fucks.8
 
In 2004, the company unveiled a new feature that would become one of the defining 
characteristics of its platform: the Facebook Wall, which offered users a place to post messages 
to their friends. By December of that year there were over one million active users of the site. 
After further injections of venture capital, in 2005 Facebook launched a version of the site 
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9  ‘Facebook Gave Device Makers 
Deep Access to Data on Users 
and Friends’, Gabriel Dance, 
Nicholas Confessore and Michael 
LaForcia, The New York Times, 3 
June 2018
10  ‘Did Facebook miss a massive 
opportunity by building a walled 
garden instead of a truly open 
platform?’, Mathew Ingram, 
GigaOM, 24 July 2013.
11  ‘Long Live the Web: A Call for 
Continued Open Standards and 
Neutrality’, Tim Berners-Lee, 
Scientific American, December 
2010.
aimed at high-school students and by the end of the year its user base had grown to six million. 
The following year, Facebook was opened to anyone over the age of 13 and began promoting 
itself as a vehicle for business advertising. By October 2007 it had around 50 million users and 
had overtaken MySpace as the most widely used social media site in world. This was no doubt 
one reason why Microsoft bought a 1.6% stake in the company that same month for $240 
million, implying a market value of around $15 billion. 
Two other developments in 2007 were critical to the company’s exponential growth – and 
to the abuses of personal data for which it was to become notorious. One was the launch of 
Facebook’s application programming interface (API); the other was a move towards forming 
data-sharing partnerships with device manufacturers, eventually including Apple, Amazon, 
BlackBerry, Microsoft and Samsung (the true nature of these partnerships was not publicly 
reported till 2018).9
‘Move fast and break things’ was Facebook’s motto for developers working on its platform until 2014.  
(Image: Facebook)
2.2  Rhetoric of openness and inclusivity
In May 2007 at Facebook’s inaugural developers’ conference in San Francisco, 
Zuckerberg’s keynote address described, in messianic terms, how Facebook intended to 
transform the social media landscape: 
‘Right now, social networks are closed platforms. And today, we’re going to end that. With 
this evolution of Facebook Platform, any developer worldwide is going to be able to build full 
applications on top of the social graph, inside the Facebook framework.’10
The rhetoric was of openness and inclusivity. The reality that emerged over the next few years 
was very different, as observers soon began to point out. One such was Tim Berners-Lee, often 
credited as the inventor of the World Wide Web, who in 2010 wrote11 in Scientific American: 
‘The Web evolved into a powerful, ubiquitous tool because it was built on egalitarian principles and 
because thousands of individuals, universities and companies have worked, both independently 
and together as part of the World Wide Web Consortium, to expand its capabilities based on those 
principles. The Web as we know it, however, is being threatened in different ways. Some of its 
most successful inhabitants have begun to chip away at its principles. Large social networking 
sites are walling off information posted by their users from the rest of the Web.’
Berners-Lee was also concerned by the growing threat from online surveillance technologies 
used to profile Web users:
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12  Zuckerberg Senate Transcript 
2018, Wikisource.org, 2018.
13  ’Facebook Launches Facebook 
Platform; They are the Anti-
MySpace’, Michael Arrington, 
TechCrunch, 24 May 2007.
14 ’Facebook: One Social Graph to 
Rule Them All?’, CBS News, 21 
April 2010. 
‘Other threats to the web result from meddling with the Internet, including snooping […] The 
URIs that people use reveal a good deal about them. A company that bought URI profiles of 
job applicants could use them to discriminate in hiring people with certain political views, for 
example. Life insurance companies could discriminate against people who have looked up 
cardiac symptoms on the Web. Predators could use the profiles to stalk individuals. We would 
all use the Web very differently if we knew that our clicks can be monitored and the data shared 
with third parties.’ 
Berners-Lee had correctly identified the main factors that have fed into the attacks on 
democracy that Facebook’s platform was to facilitate a few years down the line. What he could 
not have predicted at the time is quite how these factors would come together to cause havoc 
around the world.
2.3  Monetising personal data
The key to this was that at the same time as ‘walling off’ data collected from its users 
through their use of its own and other sites, Facebook was also devising ways in which 
this data could be monetised by making it available to third parties. 
The principal way in which Facebook does this is not to sell data directly to advertisers, but 
to use its own wealth of data harvested from users to place targeted ads on its users’ feeds. 
Zuckerberg explained this succinctly in testimony to a hearing of the joint Senate Judiciary and 
Commerce Committees in April 2018:
‘What we allow is for advertisers to tell us who they want to reach, and then we do the placement. 
So, if an advertiser comes to us and says, ‘All right, I am a ski shop and I want to sell skis to 
women,’ then we might have some sense, because people shared skiing-related content, or 
said they were interested in that, they shared whether they’re a woman, and then we can show 
the ads to the right people without that data ever changing hands and going to the advertiser.’12
But there is another way in which Facebook has exploited user data, and it was this that was to 
prove central to the Cambridge Analytica affair and other data breaches: by making it available 
to third-party app developers. This was not done to raise revenue directly – developers were 
not paying for access to the data – but rather to increase Facebook’s own market share by 
making itself an environment rich in platform-specific apps that could be used both by regular 
Facebook subscribers and by businesses as vectors for delivering ads. 
As the tech-industry news website TechCrunch reported in 2007 when the Facebook API was 
launched, the new technology gave enormous scope to third parties to exploit not just the 
Facebook platform but also the personal data of its users: 
‘Facebook is giving an unprecedented amount of access to developers […]  Applications can 
serve their own ads and/or conduct transactions with users […] The payoff is two way. Not only 
do developers get deep access to Facebook’s twenty million users, Facebook also becomes a 
rich platform for third party applications.’13
Within six months of the API being introduced, more than 10,000 apps had launched on the 
Facebook platform.                                                                                      
2.4  The social graph: turning people into ‘inventory’
For both app designers and device manufacturers, what Facebook offered above all else 
was access to what the company calls its ‘social graph’. This is essentially a model of 
the social network that maps the interconnections and activities of all its users, and has been 
described as ‘the global mapping of everybody and how they’re related’.14
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15  ‘23-year-old Mark Zuckerberg 
has Google Sweating’, Abbey 
Klaasen, AdAge, 9 July 2007. 
16  AdAge, ibid.
17  ‘A developer built a Facebook 
app as a ‘thought experiment’ 
to see how much data people 
would give up – and got almost 
1 million users’, Shona Gosh, 
Business Insider, 20 March 2018.
18  ’How Facebook’s platform made 
it worth billions – and set it up 
for a fall’, Owen Thomas, The San 
Francisco Chronicle, 21 March 
2018.
The social graph was and is an extraordinarily powerful tool for the targeting of personalised 
advertising. Advertising industry magazine AdAge reported in 2007: ‘While Google knows what 
millions of people are searching for, Facebook has something the search giant hasn’t been able 
to grow: a network of connections between people that creates a viral distribution platform 
unrivalled by any portal or search engine.’15 
As Facebook’s then Chief Operating Officer, Owen Van Natta, explained to the magazine: 
‘A visit to Amazon.com will uncover all the product recommendations one might want but the 
value can be limited in the anonymity of the people posting the reviews. On the other hand, if 
you take your online activities and put them through the filter of the people you know well, those 
actions take on greater meaning.’
In terms that now seem heavily laden with historical irony, Van Natta stressed that it was the 
authenticity of these social connections that gave them such value: 
There’s not a lot of utility for it outside of using it to connect with real friends. If you put up a 
fake profile on Facebook, people won’t connect to it. 
In its drive to become an app-rich platform that could dominate the social media space, Facebook 
allowed and indeed encouraged app developers to monetise their apps through subscription 
services, e-commerce and advertising. As its Senior VP Sales helpfully explained in 2007: 
‘In order to get great applications built, we needed to make sure developers could be rewarded 
and have a business model around it.’ He said with 29 million users, there’s plenty of inventory 
for him to sell and that he envisions the better the applications are, the more time people will 
spend on the site and the more he can sell to marketers.’16
The description of people who use Facebook as ‘inventory’ could hardly be a clearer indication 
of the way in which Facebook has based its entire business model on the commodification 
of users and their personal data, bearing out with a vengeance the old ad industry maxim: ‘If 
you’re not paying for the product, you are the product.’ 
For app developers, the social graph that underpinned the Facebook API offered easy access to 
user data that allowed them to personalise these users’ experience – and to target them with 
ads for their own products and those of others. Facebook did require developers using its API to 
sign an agreement not to sell user data and to delete it if requested, but as one developer who 
made extensive use of the API has explained, for years it was extremely easy to obtain not just 
the personal data of app users but also those of their Facebook friends, and the agreement to 
use this data responsibly was all but impossible to enforce, even if Facebook had wanted to:
It was all an agreement, there’s no way they could have policed that. Thousands will have 
retrieved data that consumers had allowed, but their friends had not knowingly [allowed]. 
Thousands will have broken the agreements they had with Facebook, and used data or derived 
data in ways contrary to the intent and interpretation of that developer agreement.17
App companies were often unscrupulous in the way that they used the Facebook platform to 
maximise their revenues, for instance by spamming an app users’ friends with posts in the name 
of the user. The hugely successful (and highly addictive) Farmville app, a game from developer 
Zynga that encouraged users to spend real money on in-game currency to buy virtual items, 
was notorious for this. ‘I did every horrible thing in the book,’ admitted Marc Pincus, Zynga’s 
co-founder and an early Facebook investor, in 2009.18 By the end of that year, Facebook’s user 
base was well on the way to half a billion users.
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2.5  Privacy issues proliferate
Concerns over the uses made of personal data collected by Facebook had emerged 
even before its new platform was launched in 2007 but began to proliferate rapidly 
thereafter. Many users were disturbed by a tracking system known as Beacon, launched 
by Facebook in November of that year. This allowed third-party websites to send data about 
user behaviour on their sites to Facebook, which in turn used it to display information about 
purchases, games played, etc. on the user’s news feed. Facebook introduced an opt-out of this 
system for users, but there were well-sourced allegations that the company continued to collect 
such data even when Facebook users had opted out, and even when they were not logged into 
Facebook.20
Facebook, following a pattern that was by now becoming familiar, simply brushed off such 
concerns. Asked by a New York Times reporter whether it was collecting data on their purchases 
from users who had opted out of the system, the company’s VP Marketing and Operations 
replied: ‘Absolutely not. One of the things we are still trying to do is dispel a lot of misinformation 
that is being propagated unnecessarily.’21
After a successful class action lawsuit in the US, however, Facebook announced in 2009 that 
it was withdrawing the Beacon tool. A spokesperson for the company claimed at the time: ‘We 
learned a great deal from the Beacon experience. For one, it was underscored how critical it is 
to provide extensive user control over how information is shared.’ The fact that Facebook had 
‘learned’ from this experience was not borne out by subsequent developments.22 
In 2008, as criticism of Beacon intensified, Facebook launched a new data-sharing tool, Facebook 
Connect, which supposedly aimed to correct Beacon’s mistakes by requiring Facebook users 
to take deliberate action before they shared their activities from other websites. However, there 
was another purpose to Facebook Connect, which was to enable Facebook to more easily 
partner with major branded content providers. The idea was that Facebook users would be 
able to log into these providers’ sites by using their Facebook IDs; the corollary, of course, was 
that Facebook would receive data on precisely what content its users were engaging with on 
partner sites, which soon included many high-profile brands such as CNN and TripAdvisor.
Concerns quickly arose when users who connected with various online services via their 
Facebook IDs found that they had unwittingly installed apps that linked to Facebook and started 
posting content, without their knowledge, on their timelines. Many Facebook users were 
unhappy with their data being used to spam them and their friends in this way.
This was among the factors that led to a major investigation by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada in 2009. The investigation was launched after a group of law students 
at the University of Ottawa’s Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic filed a 35-page complaint 
19  Wikipedia, 17 December 2018 
(based on Facebook data).
20  ’Facebook’s Beacon More 
Intrusive Than Previously 
Thought’, Juan Carlos Perez, PC 
World, 30 November 2007.
21  ‘Facebook Executive Discusses 
Beacon Brouhaha’, Brad 
Stone, The New York Times, 29 
November 2007.
22  ’Facebook to end Beacon 
tracking tool in settlement’, 







2004 2006  2008   2010    2012     2014     2016
MONTHLY USERS OF FACEBOOK (MILLION), 2004-17 19
13
23  ’Ottawa law students file 
complaint over Facebook’, CCTV 
News Ottawa, 31 May 2009.
24  ‘Privacy Complaint Filed Against 
Facebook’, Grant Gross, CSO 
Online, 2 June 2009.
25  ’Report of Findings into the 
Complaint Filed by the Canadian 
Internet Policy and Public 
Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) against 
Facebook Inc. under the Personal 
Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act’, Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada, 16 July 2009.
26  ’Facebook Announces Privacy 
Improvements in Response to 
Recommendations by Canadian 
Privacy Commissioner’,  
Facebook Newsroom, 27 August 
2009.
27  ’Remarks at a Press Conference 
on the Facebook Investigation’, 
Elizabeth Denham, Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
27 August 2009.
28  ’Canada flagged Facebook’s 
third-party app privacy problem 
way back in 2009’, Patrick Cain, 
Global News, 5 April 2018.
with the Commissioner alleging 22 separate violations of Canadian privacy laws. As one of the 
students explained:
‘To boil it down simply, it’s an issue of honesty and an issue of consent. Facebook isn’t being 
completely honest with its users. It presents itself as a social utility site . . . but they are actually 
involved in a lot of commercial activities.’ 23
The complainants pointed out that Facebook’s privacy settings and terms of use were so hard 
to access and understand that they were likely to be missed by many users (Facebook at the 
time had some seven million of these in Canada). They also noted that even if users opted for 
the highest privacy settings, their personal data could still be shared by friends with lower 
privacy settings, and that Facebook subscribers using third-party apps on the site were – often 
unwittingly – sharing their data by default with the app developers.24
Canada’s Privacy Commission published its findings in July 2009. Its report concluded that 
the allegations were well-founded in four areas: default privacy settings, collection and use of 
users’ personal information for advertising purposes, disclosure of users’ personal information 
to third-party application developers, and collection and use of non-users’ personal information. 
The report’s author, Assistant Privacy Commissioner Elizabeth Denham, stressed that the 
Commission was particularly concerned by the issue of data-sharing with third parties:
Most notably, regarding third-party applications, the Assistant Commissioner determined 
that Facebook did not have adequate safeguards in place to prevent unauthorised access by 
application developers to users’ personal information, and furthermore was not doing enough 
to ensure that meaningful consent was obtained from individuals for the disclosure of their 
personal information to application developers.25
2.6  Trust us, we’ve changed
In response to these findings, in August 2009 Facebook announced what appeared to be 
its intention to introduce major new privacy safeguards, including:
‘… a new permissions model that will require applications to specify the categories of 
information they wish to access and obtain express consent from the user before any data is 
shared. In addition, the user will also have to specifically approve any access to their friends’ 
information, which would still be subject to the friend’s privacy and application settings.’26
Assistant Privacy Commissioner Elizabeth Denham expressed herself satisfied with Facebook’s 
commitment to meaningful change.27 Not everyone was convinced, however. David Fewer of 
the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, whose complaints against Facebook had 
led to the original investigation, later commented: 
‘The privacy commissioner at the time kind of gave the green light to Facebook, and from our 
perspective that was really problematic, especially the access to third-party content through 
the API. They reached a resolution which did away with our complaint, and basically gave the 
green light to Facebook to keep on doing what they do.’ 28
Many, including Elizabeth Denham herself, have also since had reason to reflect on whether 
Facebook’s assurances in 2009 were given far too much credence.
Indications that this might be the case were not long in coming. In 2010, the Wall Street Journal 
reported that many of the most popular third-party Facebook apps ‘have been transmitting 
identifying information – in effect, providing access to people’s names and, in some cases, 
their friends’ names – to dozens of advertising and Internet tracking companies’. The WSJ also 
noted that despite Facebook’s supposed improvements to user privacy controls, the recently 
launched control panel did not ‘detail what information friends’ applications have accessed 
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about a user’. This was later to prove a crucial point in the Cambridge Analytica data scandal.29
Writing in The Financial Times in May 2010, John Gapper was also highly critical of Facebook’s 
attitude to protecting its users’ privacy and personal data, which he described as ‘displaying 
a disregard bordering on disdain’. Gapper noted that ‘Facebook’s privacy controls are now so 
complex and hard to understand that many have been nudged into ‘sharing’ a lot, just as Mr 
Zuckerberg wishes.’ He also described how the ‘improvements’ to privacy controls heralded by 
Facebook had actually involved making a great deal more personal data publicly available by 
default, including gender, location and users’ friends lists.30
Gapper observed that Zuckerberg’s open letter assuring Facebook users that their privacy 
would now be better protected contrasted with the approach he outlined at the Facebook 
developers’ conference just a few months later, in which he had proclaimed ‘we are building 
towards a web where the default is social,’ and with the ‘Orwellian’ warning now given to the 
site’s users: ‘When you connect with an application or website, it will have access to General 
Information about you.’ The phrase ‘General Information’ was indeed to prove a remarkable 
piece of obfuscatory Newspeak.
2.7  The ‘open graph’ and the growing backlash
The 2009 developers’ conference that Gapper described had been used by Facebook to 
announce a major new development, the so called ‘open graph’. Zuckerberg’s keynote 
described this as ‘one of the most transformative things for the Web we’ve ever done.’ 
As industry magazine TechCrunch reported:
‘Facebook has redesigned its Graph API for developers so that not only can they see the social 
connections between people, but they can also see and create the connections people have with 
their interests—things, places, brands, and other sites […] Facebook wants it to be defined by 
social connections, likes and dislikes, interests that are coded and machine-readable. ‘Our goal 
is to use the open graph so people can have instantly social experiences wherever they go,’ he 
[Zuckerberg] says.’31
Who could object to having ‘social experiences wherever they go’? Growing numbers of people, 
it turned out, were none too happy about the level of surveillance tracking that Facebook’s ‘open 
graph’ was subjecting them to. This was reflected on Facebook itself, where several groups 
sprang up to demand better privacy controls under titles such as ‘Millions Against Facebook’s 
Privacy Policies and Layout Redesigns’ and ‘Protest: Restoring The Age Of Privacy To Facebook’. 
Others concluded that the best way to protest was simply to leave the network: 31 May 2010 
saw the first ‘Quit Facebook Day’. The campaign had been initiated by two software developers 
under the slogan: ‘Sick of Facebook’s lack of respect for your data? Add you name to commit 
and quit!’ 
More than 33,000 people renounced their use of the network on that single day, but as 
commentators pointed out this was a mere pinprick in the company’s subscriber base, 
which had by then grown to some 500 million globally. The Guardian observed, percipiently if 
optimistically: ‘Ultimately, it won’t be an unofficial rabble of protesters that bothers Facebook or 
forces more coherent improvement; it will be US regulators.’32
Facebook was indeed supremely unbothered by the protests. But nor was it greatly troubled by 
further, tentative moves by lawmakers. In May 2010, the Chairman of the US House Judiciary 
Committee asked Facebook, along with Google, to cooperate with inquiries into privacy practices 
at the two companies. Facebook’s Director of Public Policy, Tim Sparapani, responded with a 
letter that, in its breezy disregard for the truth, can be seen to epitomise Facebook’s trademark 
approach to such inquiries:
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‘The question posed in your letter asks whether Facebook shares users’ personal information 
with third parties without the knowledge of users. The answer is simple and straightforward: 
we do not. We have designed our system and policies so that user information is never shared 
without our users’ knowledge.’ 33
A year after the first Quit Facebook Day, the company launched a disturbingly powerful new 
facial recognition system, ‘Tag Suggestions’, which compared newly uploaded photos to those 
in its database of the user’s friends – and was turned on by default for every user. The ostensible 
purpose was to suggest that the user tagged these friends into the photos, but observers were 
not slow to point out that the system could, in conjunction with other AI systems, be put to many 
other, less benign uses.
 
W h at ’ s  i n  a  f a c e ?
The ability of facial recognition systems to do more than simply identify people was to 
prove of great interest to Michal Kosinski, a psychologist who has worked extensively 
with Facebook data. 
In 2013, as a PhD student at Cambridge University’s Psychometrics Centre, Kosinski 
co-authored a paper on personality analysis, using behavioural data harvested from some 
58,000 people via a Facebook app. It demonstrated a strong relationship between these 
people’s Facebook likes and their psychological and demographic traits. This might seem 
obvious enough, but Kosinski and his co-authors were able to show that the algorithm they 
had developed, if supplied with enough data, could make more accurate assessments of a 
person’s personality than their real-life friends. Kosinski claims that Mark Zuckerberg and 
other Facebook staff were well aware of his research.
Kosinski went on to publish a paper claiming to show how algorithms applied to facial 
analysis could be used to detect personal characteristics including IQ, a predisposition to 
commit certain types of crime, and even to distinguish between gay and straight people. He 
also claims to have used similar techniques to distinguish between the faces of Republicans 
and Democrats.34  
This research was plainly of more than academic interest, as was a subsequent paper of 
Kosinski’s in 2017, which described how assessing psychological traits from digital footprints 
could be used effectively for:
‘…psychological mass persuasion—that is, the adaptation of persuasive appeals to the 
psychological characteristics of large groups of individuals with the goal of influencing their 
behavior. On the one hand, this form of psychological mass persuasion could be used to help 
people make better decisions and lead healthier and happier lives. On the other hand, it could 
be used to covertly exploit weaknesses in their character and persuade them to take action 
against their own best interest, highlighting the potential need for policy interventions.’35
By the time this paper appeared, the world was becoming aware that such techniques had 
already been put into practice by a company that had shown a keen interest in Kosinski’s 
earlier research and that of his university colleague Aleksandr Kogan: Cambridge Analytica. 
And the previous year, in the run-up to the US presidential election, Kosinski had accepted an 
invitation to share his insights with an unusual audience consisting of Russian politicians and 
state officials, as part of an ‘educational day’ in Moscow arranged by Sberbank Corporate 
University, a subsidiary of the sanctioned, Kremlin-linked bank.36
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2.8  The ‘insider pig pile’: Facebook goes public
In May 2012, Facebook held its initial public offering (IPO), selling 421 million shares on 
the US Nasdaq exchange for an initial price of $38 per share, based on a valuation of the 
company at $104 billion.
While this was heralded as the biggest ever technology IPO, the stock price fell sharply in the 
days and weeks following the offering. Commentators noted that the real short-term winners 
were not investors who’d bought into the IPO, including pension funds and many Facebook 
employees, but Facebook’s founders and venture capital backers. ‘Facebook left nothing for 
the common investor,’ commented Forbes publisher Richard Kilgaard. ‘The insider pig pile of 
(private equity) firms and celebrity Silicon Valley angels took it all.’ An equity analyst concurred: 
‘VCs made tons of money. Facebook employees got screwed.’ 37
One reason for the initial slump in Facebook’s stock price was that its IPO valuation had been 
based on a figure of 108 times the company’s 2011 earnings, which would require phenomenal 
revenue growth to be justified. Many observers were sceptical that Facebook advertising could 
deliver growth at this level. As one wrote: 
Facebook may try to wring more revenue from the users it has through more or better advertising, 
in a bid to meet what will be insatiable investor demand for growth. But the company’s users 
are sensitive to invasive marketing and major advertisers have already raised questions about 
the effectiveness of ads on the site.38
Despite such doubts, Facebook has proved an extremely lucrative investment for its backers. 
Between its IPO in May 2012 and the end of October 2018, it generated a 373.9% return for 
shareholders (not accounting for reinvested dividends).39
Shareholders of the company before the IPO have made many times this. Zuckerberg alone 
saw his personal wealth rise to some $19 billion on the day of the IPO, and by July 2018 it had 
climbed to over $80 billion, reflecting the company’s market capitalisation of more than $600 
billion.40
Three of Facebook’s founders – Zuckerberg41, Dustin Moscovitz and Eduardo Saverin – still hold 
very substantial stakes in the company. Recent filings with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) show Zuckerberg to hold 11.92 million Class A shares indirectly through 
a series of funds, along with 392.71 million Class B shares (which confer voting rights). The 
company’s two-tier share structure means that although Zuckerberg controls around 30% of 
Facebook stock, he has well over 50% of voting rights in the company.42
Other major stakeholders include the WhatsApp founder Jan Koum, who became a Facebook 
director after WhatsApp was acquired by Facebook in 2014 and remained on its board till April 
2018; Facebook’s chief operating officer Sheryl Sandberg; and the company’s chief technology 
officer Michael Schroepfer.
 
F R I E N D S  W I T H  B E N E F I T S ?
 
Several venture capital firms that invested in Facebook before its IPO remain major 
stakeholders, and there has recently been considerable speculation as to whether 
some of these may have had other types of gain in mind in addition to the purely 
financial. 
In 2009, the company announced a $200 million investment by the venture capital firm Digital 
Sky Technologies (DST), with another $100 million in further investment by the company 
planned. ‘DST stood out because of the global perspective they bring,’ Zuckerberg explained.
DST was owned by the Russian billionaire investor Yuri Milner, who was also making other 
multi-million-dollar investments in US tech firms at the time (he went on to become one 
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of Twitter’s largest investors).  It later emerged Mr Milner had close connections with the 
Kremlin and with oligarchs close to Vladimir Putin, and that DST’s Facebook investment 
was financed in part by Gazprom Investholding, a subsidiary of the state-controlled Russian 
energy company Gazprom. 
Gazprom Investholding is described by Ilya Zaslavskiy of the Kleptocracy Initiative as being 
‘used for politically important and strategically important deals for the Kremlin’. The Gazprom 
money flowed into DST via loans to Kanton Services, a company registered in the British 
Virgin Islands and used as an investment vehicle by the Uzbek-Russian oligarch Alisher 
Usmanov, who was also a director of Gazprom.43
Yuri Milner’s career in Russia before moving to Silicon Valley had seen him work closely with 
Usmanov to build a large stake in one of Russia’s largest internet companies, Mail.ru, where 
Milner served as CEO till 2003 and remained chairman of the board until 2012. 
In April 2018, Wired magazine revealed that not only had Mail.ru run hundreds of apps on 
Facebook that would have enabled it to collect users’ data without their consent, but that 
Facebook had granted it a special extension to allow it to continue doing so even after the 
company changed its rules in 2014 to stop such third-party data collection. It is not known 
to what uses the data collected in this way was put, but as former US diplomat Brett Bruen 
comments: ‘If you are a Russian businessperson of a certain scale, you can’t escape the 
requirements Russian intelligence services are going to put on you. This is the reality of 
doing business in Russia today’.44
It is also worth noting that among Facebook’s early investors was the app developer Marc 
Pincus, founder of Zynga – the company whose Farmville app helped set the trend for 
harvesting of Facebook users’ data by third-party apps.45
 
2.9  Insatiable demand for growth
In response to investors’ demand for growth to fulfil the company’s price/earnings ratio, 
Facebook stepped up its efforts to wring revenue out of its operations and to enter new 
markets – geographical and in terms of online and mobile services – in which to do this. 
Even before the IPO, it had acquired image-sharing site Instagram in April 2012. Other major 
acquisitions that followed included facial recognition platform Face.com later that year and 
instant messenger app WhatsApp in 2014 (the latter purchase was accompanied by a major 
surge in Facebook’s stock price).
Announcing the $19 billion WhatsApp acquisition, Zuckerberg deployed the by-now familiar 
Facebook rhetoric of inclusivity, framing the takeover as an act of philanthropy:
‘Our mission is to make the world more open and connected. We do this by building services 
that help people share any type of content with any group of people they want. WhatsApp will 
help us do this by continuing to develop a service that people around the world love to use every 
day […] We also expect that WhatsApp will add to our efforts for Internet.org, our partnership 
to make basic internet services affordable for everyone.’ 46
Over the next four years, WhatsApp was indeed to become massively popular in developing 
countries and by the end of 2017 it had 1.5 billion users worldwide, even more than the 1.3 
billion users of Facebook Messenger. ‘Now Facebook is finally getting serious about monetising 
WhatsApp with the recent launch of the WhatsApp for Business app,’ reported TechCrunch in 
early 2018. ‘Facebook plans to charge business owners for additional commerce, customer 
service or broadcasting tools. And with such a massive audience, merchants will be clamouring 
for them.’47 So much for philanthropy. 
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W h at s A p p  ly n c h  m o b s
 
The effectiveness of WhatsApp in helping people ‘share any type of content with any 
group of people they want’ was demonstrated by a spate of mob lynchings in India in 
2018, when rumours of child abductions were spread by false messages and doctored 
videos shared on the messaging service. 
In one such incident an innocent man was brutally beaten and his friend killed, with eight 
police officers who tried to protect them also injured. A BBC reporter spoke to one of the 
villagers who witnessed the violence:
‘I think there were around 1,000 people,’ says Vijay Patil, an eyewitness who owns a tea stall 
in Murki. ‘We all received the video on the group,’ he says, adding that he left the group that 
night after seeing what a ‘single video on WhatsApp had done’.48
Similar WhatsApp lynchings have been reported from other countries. In Mexico, for instance, 
a mob responded to child abduction rumours spread on WhatsApp in the state of Puebla in 
August 2018 by burning two men to death. Photos of the incident show a crowd holding up 
their mobile phones to capture video of the burning victims to share with their friends.49
On the advertising front, continued rapid growth in user numbers and aggressive marketing 
tactics led to steep growth in revenues, rising to nearly 40 billion dollars in 2017 despite a fall 
in the number of user hours spent on the platform. 
Commenting on that year’s figures, Zuckerberg appeared to respond to growing concerns over 
the damaging impacts that content shared via Facebook was having worldwide, and over the 
phenomenon – by now widely recognised – of social media addiction:
‘… we made changes to show fewer viral videos to make sure people’s time is well spent. In 
total, we made changes that reduced time spent on Facebook by roughly 50 million hours every 
day. By focusing on meaningful connections, our community and business will be stronger over 
the long term.’ 50
Just what might be concealed by the phrase ‘meaningful connections’ was about to be revealed 
by the investigations described in Section 3 of this report.
 
F a l s e  i d e n t i t i e s
The potential for Facebook to be used to disseminate disinformation and other 
damaging material under false or misleading identities has long been evident. In 
2008, for example, a university admissions administrator noticed that a number of Facebook 
Groups purporting to be those of year groups of students at various US universities were in 
fact nothing of the kind but had been set up as a surreptitious marketing ploy by ‘College 
Prowler’, an organisation aiming to market products to these groups of students.51
Many of the problems relating to falsification of identities stem from Facebook’s lax 
approach to user verification: in August 2012, the company revealed that more than 83 
million Facebook accounts (8.7% of total users) were fakes, many of these used for various 
types of scam or spam.52
While the company has made some efforts to tackle this problem, the number of fake 
accounts has continued to multiply. In the first quarter of 2018 alone, in the wake of the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook shut down 583 million fake accounts. Although 
many of these were detected soon after being set up, the company estimated that 3-4% of 
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its more than two billion monthly active users were also fakes.53
There have also been several high-profile instances of hackers simply stealing personal 
data of the sort typically used in identity fraud. In October 2018, for instance, the company 
revealed that a software vulnerability had allowed the theft of personal data from some 50 
million users, in many cases including search history, location data and information about 
their relationships and religion.
Perhaps even more shocking than the theft itself was Facebook’s reaction to it: unlike other 
major companies whose customers had suffered from similar data breaches, it said it had no 
plans to provide protection services for concerned users. Instead it referred them to a help 
page on its website.54
 
2.10  Trust us, this time we’ve really changed
Between 2012 and 2015, the rising clamour over abuse of Facebook users’ personal 
data led to further investigations by regulatory authorities and legal action against the 
company by user groups. In 2011 and 2012 the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (IDPC) 
audited Facebook’s European headquarters in Ireland and identified various issues related to 
Facebook users’ control over how their own personal data and that of their friends was accessed. 
This was prompted in part by complaints made by Austrian data protection campaigner Max 
Schrems, who was by no means satisfied with the IDPC’s failure to take strong action against 
the company. In 2014, Schrems mounted a class action on behalf of some 25,000 Facebook 
users in Europe, which alleged that Facebook’s collection and use of data amounted to illegal 
mass surveillance.55
In response to the ongoing concerns, Facebook announced at its 2014 F8 developers’ conference 
that it would be shutting down access to users’ friends’ data that had previously been granted 
to third-party apps, starting with any new apps that were launched. A year later, in April 2015, 
it stated that all Facebook apps would now be denied such access, and would have to conform 
with a new log-in system that required apps to get the specific consent of users for any data 
permissions they sought.  
A company spokesman told reporters of Zuckerberg’s enthusiasm for a new Facebook slogan, 
‘People First’, because ‘if people don’t feel comfortable using Facebook and specifically logging 
into Facebook and using Facebook in apps, we don’t have a platform, we don’t have developers. 
When people are confident, they feel happier and use our stuff more, and that’s what we’re 
trying to achieve,’ he explained.56
Once again, the people-friendly rhetoric masked a very different reality.
2.11  Trading data for revenue
In December 2018 the UK House of Commons Digital, Culture Media and Sport Committee 
gained access to a dossier of emails and other documents that had been obtained from 
Facebook by the app developer Six4Three as part of legally required disclosure in a suit 
the company had brought against Facebook for ‘destroying its business’. The documents 
gave the lie to the assurances Facebook had given in 2014 and 2015, and showed that it had 
continued to allow favoured app developers access to users’ personal data and that of their 
friends, linking this to revenue that it could reap from the developers. As the committee’s chair, 
Damian Collins, observed:
‘Facebook have clearly entered into whitelisting agreements with certain companies, which 
54  ‘Facebook hack victims will not 
get ID theft protection’, Dave Hill, 
BBC News, 12 October 2012.
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Its API For Giving Your Friends’ 
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TechCrunch,  28 April 2015.
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meant that after the platform changes in 2014/15 they maintained full access to friends data 
[…] The idea of linking access to friends data to the financial value of the developers relationship 
with Facebook is a recurring feature of the documents.’ 57
The disclosures also detailed the way in which Facebook had deliberately obscured the level 
of data harvesting that it was undertaking from users, particularly in regard to changes to its 
policies on the Android mobile phone system, which enabled the company to amass records of 
calls and texts sent by users.
Facebook’s response to the exposure of these documents was characteristically misleading:
‘We stand by the platform changes we made in 2015 to stop a person from sharing their 
friends’ data with developers. Like any business, we had many internal conversations about the 
various ways we could build a sustainable business model for our platform. But the facts are 
clear: we’ve never sold people’s data.’ 58
But the simple exchange of data for cash was not what the disclosures had shown. It was, rather, 
the granting of privileged access to data to developers and business partners who delivered 
a certain level of revenue to Facebook, even after the company had publicly announced that 
it was stopping this practice. This was further confirmed later the same month, when it was 
revealed that Facebook had given some of the world’s largest technology companies far more 
intrusive access to users’ personal data than it had disclosed, effectively exempting them from 
its privacy safeguards. This included enabling Microsoft’s Bing search engine to see the names 
of virtually all Facebook users’ friends without consent and allowing Netflix and Spotify to read 
Facebook users’ private messages – a flagrant violation of the agreement that Facebook had 
made with the US Federal Trade Commission that it would not share user data without explicit 
permission.59
 
F u e l l i n g  i n t e r c o m m u n a l  v i o l e n c e  i n  S r i  L a n k a 
 
In March 2018, posts spreading misinformation about and inciting violence against the 
Muslim community in Sri Lanka were made on Facebook pages in Sri Lanka, leading 
to widespread attacks on Muslims by Buddhist mobs. Videos contained in the posts and 
widely circulated claimed to show Buddhist temples being torched by Muslims.
Sri Lanka’s telecommunications minister, Harin Fernando, said that Facebook had taken far 
too long to respond to requests to take down the inflammatory posts, pointing for instance 
to one post that read (in Sinhalese): ‘Kill all Muslims, don’t even let an infant of the dogs 
escape.’ A Facebook user who alerted Facebook to the post ‘received a reply six days later 
saying the post did not contravene a specific Facebook community standard’.
After days of violence and several deaths, the Sri Lankan government temporarily blocked 
Facebook, WhatsApp and other platforms in Sri Lanka. ‘This whole country could have been 
burning in hours,’ Fernando said. ‘Hate speech is not being controlled by these organisations 
and it has become a critical issue globally.’ 60
 
2.12  Bigger than any religion
In June 2017, Facebook proudly announced that it had ‘reached a new milestone: there 
are now 2 billion people connecting and building communities on Facebook every month’. 
This gave the company an opportunity to sound, once again, a messianic note:  
‘This wouldn’t have happened without the millions of smaller communities and individuals 
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who are sharing and making meaningful contributions every day. Each day, more than 175 
million people share a Love reaction, and on average, over 800 million people like something on 
Facebook. More than 1 billion people use Groups every month […] Every day, people connect 
with one another, contribute to their local communities and help make the world a better place.’61
As Christopher Ingraham wrote in The Washington Post, Facebook now had more users than 
any world religion had adherents, with the exception of Christianity and (it was to overtake 
Christianity just a few months later). In number terms, Facebook users also now outstripped the 
speakers of any single language. ‘Likes, shares, comments and friend requests are becoming 
the closest thing humanity has to a universal tongue,’ Ingraham enthused.62
Ingraham noted some of the many controversies in which the company had become embroiled, 
but was happy to shrug these off: ‘Any service growing that quickly is bound to experience 
some mishaps.’ His piece ended with the words: 
‘It’s easy to forget that none of us  –  not even Facebook – have any idea what it truly means to 
have a quarter of humanity plugged into a single product, governed by a single set of rules and 
norms, uploading deeply personal information to a single database, making a single company 
the gateway between ourselves and the advertisers who want us to buy stuff. We just go with it, 
riding the tide of likes and shares into whatever Facebook’s future holds for us.’
But Facebook’s record over the past decade and a half gave ample reason to resist such a blithe 
acceptance that the company should be left to create whatever future it saw fit for humanity. 
And – as the next section of our report describes – all over the world, people were beginning to 
understand just what kind of a future this might be, and how Facebook had greatly empowered 
forces that posed a grave threat to the chances of democracy surviving within it. 
62  ‘If Facebook were a religion, it 
would be the second largest 
in the world’,  Christopher 
Ingraham, The Washington Post, 
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Maximilian Schrems, an Austrian activist and author, became known for campaigns against Facebook for privacy 
violation, including its violations of European privacy laws and alleged transfer of personal data to the US National 
Security Agency as part of the NSA’s PRISM program. Wikimedia Commons/Author Josef Weidenholzer MEP
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3.0  The attack on democracy:  
 recent findings 
This section of our report summarises the findings of three recent inquiries that have 
shed light on the impact of Facebook’s activities in the UK and other countries, bringing 
out common themes that have emerged, particularly in regard to Facebook’s role in 
enabling certain actors to exercise undue political influence by the microtargeting of 
political advertising and disinformation. It also highlights policy recommendations made by 
the inquiring bodies that will be returned to in the report’s final section.
3.1   Disinformation and ‘fake news’ inquiry by the UK House of Commons Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee
3.1.1  Background
In early 2017, following media reports that Russia had made efforts to influence the result of 
the Brexit referendum of June 2016 and the subsequent US presidential election, the UK House 
of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Committee embarked on a wide-ranging 
inquiry into disinformation and so called ‘fake news’. Its aim was to gain a clearer picture of 
‘the spread of false, misleading, and persuasive content, and the ways in which malign players, 
whether automated or human, or both together, distort what is true in order to create influence, 
to intimidate, to make money, or to influence political elections.’63
Throughout 2017 and 2018, the committee heard hundreds of hours of evidence from a wide 
variety of expert witnesses and from people who had been close to the interface between 
tech platforms and political propaganda. It also received many thousands of pages of written 
evidence. In July 2018, it published an interim report, which noted: ‘Such has been the impact of 
this agenda, the focus of our inquiry moved from understanding the phenomenon of ‘fake news’, 
distributed largely through social media, to issues concerning the very future of democracy.’
As the inquiry progressed, it found extensive evidence indicating that Facebook’s platform and 
the personal data of Facebook users had been central to efforts to manipulate voters in the UK. 
Prompted in part by investigative journalism by Carole Cadwalladr of the Observer64, Channel 4 
News and The New York Times, the committee focused in particular on the use of such data by 
three closely associated companies: SCL Group, Cambridge Analytica and AggregateIQ.
3.1.2  Cambridge Analytica/SCL
Cambridge Analytica was born out of an existing political consultancy, SCL Group, which had 
developed ‘specialist communications techniques previously developed by the military’ and 
turned these to political purposes for paying clients. It was started with the backing of the US 
hedge-fund billionaire Robert Mercer and the influential right-wing ideologue Steve Bannon, 
who served as the company’s Vice President (Bannon was also the executive chairman of the 
‘alt right’ website Breitbart and went on to serve as Donald Trump’s chief strategist). 
The committee found the precise ownership details of SCL and Cambridge Analytica 
exceptionally hard to establish, due to a complex and shifting web of cross-ownership between 
closely associated UK and US companies. In August 2017 a new ultimate holding company for 
Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group companies was set up: Emerdata Limited. Its directors 
63  Disinformation and ‘fake 
news’: Interim Report,  House 
of Commons Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee, UK 
Parliament, 29 July 2018. All 
quotes in this section are from 
this report, unless otherwise 
noted.
64  Carole Cadwalladr’s investigative 
journalism has since been 
recognised by several awards. 
Ahead of her initial report into 
the harvesting of Facebook 
data, the Guardian Media Group, 
which owns The Observer, 
received a threat of legal action 
from Facebook in an attempt 
to prevent its publication. See: 
‘Facebook says warning to 
Guardian group ‘not our wisest 
move’, Jamie Grierson, The 
Guardian, 23 March 2018.
23
included Cambridge Analytica’s CEO Alexander Nix and several other directors of SCL Group 
companies, as well as, from March 2018, Rebekah and Jennifer Mercer, daughters of Robert 
Mercer. Emerdata is chaired by Erik Prince, founder of the controversial private military group 
Blackwater USA. 
Much of the detailed information on SCL/Cambridge Analytica’s activities that the committee 
took was from two of the companies’ former employees, Christopher Wylie and Brittany Kaiser. 
It was also able to question Cambridge Analytica’s CEO Alexander Nix, though much of the 
evidence he gave was to prove misleading or simply false.
Nix described how psychological profiling underpinned Cambridge Analytica’s work, enabling it 
to target particular voters with messages that would have a strong emotional appeal. He claimed 
that the information on voters that it used for this purpose was based on ‘first-party research, 
being large, quantitative research instruments, not dissimilar to a poll’. He also claimed that 
the company did not work with or hold Facebook data, though it uses Facebook as a platform 
for advertising and ‘as a means to gather data’ via surveys ‘that the public can engage with if 
they elect to’.
As the committee found, this was far from the truth. Much of the data used by Cambridge 
Analytica derived in fact from a company called Global Science Research, founded by Aleksandr 
Kogan, a researcher at Cambridge University’s Department of Psychology. Kogan told the 
committee how he had developed a personality quiz app, ‘this is your digital life’, to collect data 
from Facebook users and their friends. As he explained: ‘It is not technically challenging in any 
way. Facebook explains how to do it.’ 
In 2014 SCL/Cambridge Analytica paid Kogan several hundred thousand dollars for the data 
itself, then more for personality profiling based on this. His contract with the company required 
him to match predictive personality scores, including individuals’ likely political interests, to 
named individuals on the electoral register of various US states in which SCL was then involved 
in political campaigns for Republican candidates. SCL later boasted that it had used behavioural 
micro-targeting to support 1.5 million advertising impressions during the US mid-term elections 
in November 2014, achieving ‘a 30% uplift in voter turnout, against the predicted turnout, for 
the targeted groups’. 
The committee found that the misuse of Facebook data that Kogan passed to Cambridge Analytica 
was ‘facilitated by Facebook’, and that this data had been ‘manipulated into micro-targeting 
[by] Cambridge Analytica and its associated companies, through AIQ’ (see below). 
Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections Ltd were wound up in the summer of 2018 in the wake 
of the scandal that had enveloped them. However, as the committee noted, ‘other companies 
are carrying out very similar work. Many of the individuals involved in SCL and Cambridge 
Analytica appear to have moved on to new corporate vehicles’.
3.1.3  AggregateIQ (AIQ)
The digital advertising and software development company AggregateIQ (AIQ) was set up in 
2013 to create various digital tools to assist Cambridge Analytica’s parent company SCL in 
its political campaigning work in various countries. One of these was the ‘Ripon’ tool, which 
Cambridge Analytica whistleblower Christopher Wylie described as ‘software that utilised the 
algorithms from the Facebook data’. Based in Canada, AIQ was supplied with personal data of 
UK voters by the Vote Leave campaign (the legality of this was a matter of interest to the UK 
Information Commissioner and to Canada’s privacy and information authorities, whose reports 
are described later in this section). This data was used to target Facebook ads on British voters 
during the Brexit referendum campaign.
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The DCMS committee also saw evidence indicating that AIQ had used an app called ‘uCampaign’, 
developed by a company of that name, which was deployed in both the Trump campaign and 
by Vote Leave’s Brexit referendum campaign. This app, which harvested the personal data of 
Facebook users and their friends and matched this against voter records, had been developed 
by an Eastern Ukrainian military veteran with the financial backing of American hedge fund 
magnate Sean Fieler, a close associate of Cambridge Analytica’s main backer, Robert Mercer. 
The committee noted that ‘AIQ had links with Vote Leave and other Brexit campaigns, 
including Be Leave, Veterans for Britain and the DUP and all used the company in the short 
period immediately prior to the EU Referendum.’ Vote Leave had spent a very large part of its 
referendum budget with the company and had been referred by the UK Electoral Commission 
to the Metropolitan Police for illegally co-ordinating such spending with other, supposedly 
separate Brexit campaign groups in order to circumvent UK laws governing such spending. 
The DCMS Committee also noted that evidence from Facebook showed that the supposedly 
separate Brexit campaign group BeLeave used datasets covering the ‘exact same audiences’ 
as those addressed by the digital advertising microtargeted by AIQ for Vote Leave. 
Despite repeated requests, Vote Leave’s campaign director, Dominic Cummings, refused to 
appear in front of the Committee to give evidence. 65
3.1.4  Data abuses
The DCMS Committee found Facebook and its users’ personal data to have played a central 
role in efforts by Cambridge Analytica, AIQ and their clients to influence the results of key votes 
in the US and the UK.
The data in question had been ‘scraped’ from Facebook users and their friends by the app 
developed by Dr Kogan. This was technically in breach of the company’s then recently revised 
terms of service. Whistleblower Christopher Wylie described the Facebook data obtained by 
Dr Kogan’s app as Cambridge Analytica’s ‘foundation dataset’, and said the company had 
collected data on up to 87 million users, the majority in the US but also including over one 
million in the UK. 
As the previous section of this report has shown, Kogan’s attitude to Facebook user data was 
shared by many other app developers and was one that the company itself had done much 
to foster. This was confirmed to the DCMS committee by former Facebook employee, Sandy 
Parakilas, who said that in his experience there had been no attempt by Facebook to establish 
an audit trail of data obtained by third parties, and that ‘once the data passed from Facebook 
servers to the developer, Facebook lost insight into what was being done with the data and lost 
control over the data’. As the committee and the Information Commissioner’s Office were to 
discover, Cambridge Analytica had not deleted the data when requested to by Facebook.
Tristan Harris of the Center for Humane Technology explained to the committee that the entire 
premise of Facebook’s app platform was to enable third-party developers to have access to 
people’s friends’ data, ‘to enable as many developers as possible to use that data in creative 
ways, to build creative new social applications on behalf of Facebook.’
3.1.5  Monopolistic business model
The DCMS committee observed that many of the problems stemming from the spread of 
disinformation on Facebook could be traced to the company’s core business model, which – as 
one of its former employees testified and as this report has also detailed – focuses above all 
else on growth in user numbers and revenues. 
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The success of Facebook and a handful of other tech companies has, the committee noted, 
‘resulted in their behaving as if they were monopolies in their specific area’. This has been 
helped by their providing free access to their services, funded by the exploitation of their users’ 
data to maximise revenues.
The report observed that ‘the users become the product of the companies, and this is where 
issues of mistrust and misuse arise’. While traditional control of monopoly power has focused 
on consumer pricing, protection of consumers against the power of the tech monopolies is 
more about the protection of data. 
In poorer countries, Facebook’s pursuit of market share has led the company to offer free 
access to services (without data charges) to anyone with a mobile phone, enabling it to become 
effectively a monopoly provider of online information for many millions of people. In Myanmar, 
noted the committee, this put it in an ideal position to be exploited by the country’s military as 
a platform for disseminating hatred for the Rohingya Muslim minority, using disinformation and 
fake accounts. 
The committee also observed that, while deploring the torrent of hate speech that had been 
released upon this minority with horrendous results (massacre, mass rape and the forced 
displacement of hundreds of thousands), Facebook’s CTO ‘could not tell us when Facebook had 
started work on limiting hate speech, he could not tell us how many fake accounts had been 
identified and removed from Burma, and he could not tell us how much revenue Facebook was 
making from Facebook users in Burma’.
It concluded that:
‘Facebook is releasing a product that is dangerous to consumers and deeply unethical […] This 
is a further example of Facebook failing to take responsibility for the misuse of its platform.’
3.1.6  Platform or publisher?
One strand of the committee’s report focused on whether Facebook should be considered as 
a publisher – with all of the responsibilities that entails – or as a mere channel, with no more 
responsibility for the content that it carries than a telephone line. Facebook has been keen for 
itself to be seen as the latter, but, as the committee observed, its algorithms are constantly 
making decisions on which content to prioritise for particular users, an editorial function more 
typical of a publisher. 
The DCMS committee noted that some countries have taken a much tougher approach than 
others to regulating the kind of content that Facebook displays, treating it in effect as a publisher. 
Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), for instance, which became law in January 
2018, forces tech companies to remove hate speech from their sites within 24 hours or incur 
fines of up to €20 million. As the committee noted, ‘one in six of Facebook’s moderators now 
works in Germany, which is practical evidence that legislation can work’.
The DCMS committee recommended that UK lawmakers consider formulating ‘a new category 
of tech company […] which tightens tech companies’ liabilities’, and that these should include 
liability for and responsibility to act against harmful and illegal content on their platforms, so 
that failure to act ‘could leave them open to legal proceedings launched either by a public 
regulator, and/or by individuals or organisations who have suffered as a result of this content 
being freely disseminated on a social media platform’.
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3.1.7  Russian use of Facebook for political interference
Aware that the US Congress had uncovered evidence of extensive use of Facebook by the 
Russian government to interfere in the US presidential election of 2016, using sophisticated 
targeting techniques and creating customised audiences ‘to amplify extreme voices in the 
campaign, [in] particular those on sensitive topics such as race relations and immigration,’ 
the  DCMS Committee sought to investigate whether the same had occurred during the Brexit 
referendum campaign in the UK and in the Catalonian independence referendum of 2017. 
Its efforts to do so ran up against a brick wall. Facebook claimed that payment for political 
ads in the UK from Russian sources had been minimal, but as the committee reported: ‘Time 
and again, Facebook chose to avoid answering our written and oral questions, to the point of 
obfuscation.’
Paid ads were anyway not the only way in which Russia may have been able to use Facebook-
derived data (see box below). The committee heard that some of the systems that had used 
the data harvested by Dr Kogan’s third-party app and passed on Cambridge Analytica and 
AIQ ‘were accessed from IP addresses that resolve to Russia and other areas of the CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States)’. It expressed its concern that ‘people in Russia could 
have benefitted from the work that Dr Kogan carried out in the UK, in connection with his work 
for Cambridge Analytica’. Kogan himself had worked on a Russian government-financed project 
in St Petersburg at the same time as he was working with Cambridge Analytica.
Following publication of its interim report, the committee received evidence showing that a 
Facebook engineer ‘had warned the company in 2014 that users apparently based in Russia 
were scooping vast amounts of data from the site on a daily basis.’ 66
3.1.8  ‘Dark ads’
The DCMS committee also looked more generally at political advertising online, noting that ‘this 
creates new issues in relation to the regulation of elections, including the nature of content and 
the cost of dissemination’.
It was particularly concerned by so-called ‘dark ads’ micro-targeted on voters, quoting a recent 
report from the UK Electoral Commission: ‘Only the voter, the campaigner and the platform 
know who has been targeted with which messages. Only the company and campaigner know 
why a voter was targeted and how much was spent on a particular campaign.’
It noted evidence from Facebook that the company had no way of categorising which adverts 
could be classified as political, and therefore no way of monitoring such ads:
‘Our systems do not have a perfect or reliable way to classify the category that advertisements 
(which are developed and distributed by third-parties on our platform) fall in, whether it is 
political or housing or educational or otherwise.’
The committee recommended an overhaul of UK law around digital campaigning, to cover also 
online adverts with political intent that are not sponsored by a specific political party:
‘There should be public register for political advertising, requiring all political advertising 
work to be listed for public display so that, even if work is not requiring regulation, it is 
accountable, clear, and transparent for all to see. There should be a ban on micro-targeted 
political advertising to lookalikes [i.e. individuals selected on the basis of their resemblance to 
other profiled individuals] online, and a minimum limit for the number of voters sent individual 
political messages should be agreed, at a national level.’66  ‘Facebook was warned of 
apparent Russian data trawl in 
2014, MPs told’, The Guardian, 
Emma Graham-Harrison and Jim 
Waterson,  27 November 2018.
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R U S S I A N  U S E  O F  F A C E B O O K  A N D  I N S TA G R A M  I N  T H E  U S
In December 2018, The Oxford Internet Institute’s Computational Propaganda 
Research Project published a report for the US Senate Intelligence Committee on the 
social media activities of Russia’s so-called ‘Internet Research Agency’ (IRA) in the 
US between 2013 and 2018. 
It found that:
‘In total, IRA posts were shared by users just under 31 million times, liked almost 39 million 
times, reacted to with emojis almost 5.4 million times, and engaged sufficient users to 
generate almost 3.5 million comments […] On Instagram, a similar pattern is evident. In 
total, all Instagram posts garnered almost 185 million likes and users commented about 4 
million times.’ 
The report concluded that the IRA had been highly effective in ‘spreading sensationalist, 
conspiratorial, and other forms of junk political news and misinformation to voters across 
the political spectrum, polarising opinion and supporting Donald Trump’s campaign.’ 67 It also 
noted that the impact of these ‘organic’ posts had been far greater than that of the relatively 
limited paid advertising from Russian sources that Facebook had (under pressure) identified 
and disclosed. No similarly in-depth study has been carried out on Russian use of social 
media to interfere in UK politics.
3.1.9  Inadequacy of self-regulation
Self-regulation by tech and social media companies was not sufficient, in the committee’s view: 
‘Government should investigate ways in which to enforce transparency requirements on 
tech companies, to ensure that paid-for political advertising data on social media platforms, 
particularly in relation to political adverts, are publicly accessible, are clear and easily searchable, 
and identify the source, explaining who uploaded it, who sponsored it, and its country of origin. 
This information should be imprinted into the content, or included in a banner at the top of 
the content. Such transparency would also enable members of the public to understand the 
behaviour and intent of the content providers.’
The question of who is paying for political advertising was also addressed:
‘Tech companies must also address the issue of shell corporations and other professional 
attempts to hide identity in advert purchasing, especially around election advertising. There 
should be full disclosure of targeting used as part of advert transparency. The Government 
should explore ways of regulating on the use of external targeting on social media platforms, 
such as Facebook’s Custom Audiences.’ 
The report called for the UK Electoral Commission to establish a code to govern advertising 
via social media during election periods, and to consider whether this should be restricted to 
registered political organisations or campaigns. It also called for closer scrutiny of ‘the ethics 
of Facebook or other relevant social media companies selling lookalike political audiences to 
advertisers […] using the data they hold on their customers to guess whether their political 
interests are similar to those profiles held in target audiences already collected by a political 
campaign’. It suggested that regulation might include a right for users of Facebook and other 
social media platforms to opt out from being included in such lookalike audiences.
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3.1.10  Lack of transparency and refusal to take responsibility
The DCMS Committee report expressed frustration at the way in which Facebook had continually 
stonewalled its efforts to get information about the company and its activities: 
Facebook consistently responded to questions by giving the minimal amount of information 
possible, and routinely failed to offer information relevant to the inquiry, unless it had been 
expressly asked for. It provided witnesses who have been unwilling or unable to give full 
answers to the Committee’s questions.
The committee’s verdict on Facebook’s overall role was damning:
‘In evidence Facebook did not accept their responsibilities to identify or prevent illegal 
election campaign activity from overseas jurisdictions. In the context of outside interference in 
elections, this position is unsustainable and Facebook, and other platforms, must begin to take 
responsibility for the way in which their platforms are used’.
T O O  B I G  T O  C A R E ?
 
Some of the most interesting evidence on Facebook heard by the committee came 
in December 2018 after it had issued its interim report, from Ashkan Soltani. Having 
worked as a primary technologist at the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on the FTC’s 
investigation into Facebook in 2010-11, Soltani went on to become chief technologist at the 
FTC. Watching livestreamed evidence taken by the committee from Richard Allan, Facebook’s 
Vice President of Policy Solutions, Soltani had been so disturbed by what he saw as Allan’s 
mendacity that he immediately approached the committee to offer evidence of his own.
He described how Facebook apps were routinely able to bypass user privacy settings to gain 
access to a wealth of user data, and some were able to access such data even without a 
user installing them. He observed:
‘I do not think Facebook is able to govern itself in this area. From my observations of public 
data as well as my conversations with multiple stakeholders inside the company, my 
understanding is that senior leadership simply does not prioritise these issues seriously 
and they will continue to do the bare minimum necessary to pass through the compliance 
regimes, but will absolutely continue to make these mistakes as their priority is monetisation 
of user data.’
Asked whether Facebook had simply grown ‘too big to care’, Soltani replied:
‘If laws are mandated, I think that they will comply with those laws. I think they have a lot of 
influence, both politically and economically. In the US, a lot of the reticence to pass strong 
policy has been about killing the golden goose; it is a leading sector in the US economy and 
there is a lot of worry that regulation will hamper that. I think that is short-sighted. For me, 
the policy debate is similar to the environmental policy debate 50 years ago, where there 
was worry about clamping down on companies for emissions and for environmental harm. 
We found that, actually, by doing so, we incentivised a great deal of innovation around solar 
energy or renewable fuels. The same is true of this industry.’ 68
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3.2  Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns by the UK  
Information Commissioner’s Office 
3.2.1  Background
In May 2017 the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) launched an investigation 
into the use of data analytics for political purposes after allegations were made about the 
‘invisible processing’ of personal data and the micro-targeting of political adverts during the EU 
referendum campaign. The investigation became the largest of its type by any data protection 
authority and covered several aspects, including the use of personal data by political parties 
and data analytics companies. However, it is the use of online social media platforms and user 
data harvested from these, and in particular from Facebook, on which our summary focuses.
The investigation spoke to over 100 ‘persons of interest’ and engaged with 172 organisations. 
Some 700 terabytes of data – the equivalent of 52.2 billion pages – were examined in the 
course of the investigation and the ICO made full use of its powers to obtain evidence, including 
attending premises to seize relevant material. The ICO also worked with several other agencies 
in the UK, including the Electoral Commission and the National Crime Agency, and with its 
counterpart authorities in Canada and the United States.
Ahead of publication of the report into its investigation in November 201869,  in July of that 
year the ICO brought out a separate report, Democracy Disrupted? Personal Information and 
Political Influence70, covering policy recommendations that related to its ongoing investigation. 
This summary also references the latter report.
3.2.2  Transparency
A key focus in the ICO’s report on its investigation was transparency. As it noted: 
‘If voters are unaware of how their data is being used to target them with political messages, 
then they won’t be empowered to exercise their legal rights in relation to that data and the 
techniques being deployed, or to challenge the messages they are receiving.’ 
The Information Commissioner found that ‘between 2007 and 2014, Facebook processed 
the personal information of users unfairly by allowing application developers access to their 
information, without sufficiently clear and informed consent.’
The ICO looked in particular at the way in which the data of up to 87 million people worldwide 
(including at least one million in the UK) had been harvested by the apps developed by Dr Kogan 
(see Section 3.1 above) and a subset of this data passed on to Cambridge Analytica and other 
parties for use in political microtargeting. It found that Facebook users had not been made 
aware: 
•  that their personal data would be provided to CA;
• that their personal data would be used for the purposes of political campaigning;
•  that their personal data would be processed in a manner that involved drawing inferences 
about their political opinions, preferences and their voting behaviour.
It also found that Facebook ‘failed to keep the personal information secure because it failed to 
make suitable checks on apps and developers using its platform’.
In addition, the ICO found that Facebook had had a close working relationship with academics 
working on research of the type Dr Kogan developed, and that ‘this included many individuals 
involved in research eventually going on to work at the company’.
Dr Kogan and Alexander Nix both refused requests from the ICO to provide accounts of the 
events in question. 
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3.2.3  Uses of data for political advertising
The ICO looked also at AggregateIQ (AIQ), the Canada-based company closely associated with 
Cambridge Analytica/SCL (see Section 3.1.3 above) and in particular at its relationship with Vote 
Leave and other Leave campaign groups during the EU referendum campaign.
It found that AIQ had created and placed advertisements for these Leave campaign groups, 
targeting these on individuals based on Facebook data and paying Facebook some $2 million for 
these placements. It found evidence to suggest that there may have been illegal co-ordination 
between different campaign groups (e.g. sharing of the same datasets). This evidence was 
passed to the UK Electoral Commission, which has subsequently referred some individuals to 
the UK police for investigation. 
Although it found no evidence to show that the Kogan/Cambridge Analytica Facebook user data 
had been used for targeting undertaken for these campaign groups, the ICO was concerned by 
the fact that personal data of UK citizens had been passed to the company by Vote Leave and 
was still held by AIQ. The ICO issued an enforcement notice to AIQ, ordering the company ‘to 
cease processing any personal data of UK or EU citizens obtained from UK political organisations 
or otherwise for the purposes of data analytics, political campaigning or any other advertising 
purposes’.
The ICO is continuing to investigate how Vote Leave delivered electronic marketing 
communications and whether its actions contravened PECR (Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Regulations).
3.2.4  Outcomes and conclusions
The ICO’s main recommendations on the uses of online platforms for political campaigning 
were contained in its ‘Democracy Disrupted’ report, and included:
•  Working with EU data protection authorities to ensure compliance with GDPR, to improve 
users’ understanding of how their data is processed for political advertising, and to ensure 
that clear and effective privacy controls are easily available to users; 
•  Urgent roll-out of better transparency features by online platforms;
•  Legislation by the UK government to introduce a statutory code of practice for use of personal 
data in political campaigns;
•  Third-party audits after referendum campaigns to ensure personal data held by campaigners 
is deleted or, if shared, that appropriate consent has been obtained;
•  A government review of regulation of online political advertising, to include consideration 
of requirements for digital political advertising to be archived in an open data repository to 
enable scrutiny and analysis.71
To reflect the seriousness of the breaches of transparency and data protection laws that it had 
uncovered at Facebook, the ICO issued the company with a penalty of £500,000, the maximum 
possible under the relevant data protection law at the time of the offences. It also referred 
outstanding issues about ‘Facebook’s targeting functions and techniques used to monitor 
individuals’ browsing habits, interactions and behaviour across the internet and different 
devices’ to the Irish Data Protection Commission, the lead authority in the EU for Facebook 
(whose European headquarters are in Dublin) under the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR).
In a message prefacing the report into its investigation, Information Commissioner Elizabeth 
Denham wrote:  
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‘When we opened our investigation into the use of data analytics for political purposes in May 
2017, we had little idea of what was to come. Eighteen months later, multiple jurisdictions are 
struggling to retain fundamental democratic principles in the face of opaque digital technologies 
[…]’ 
Parliamentarians, journalists, civil society and citizens have woken up to the fact that 
transparency is the cornerstone of democracy. Citizens can only make truly informed choices 
about who to vote for if they are sure that those decisions have not been unduly influenced. 
The invisible, ‘behind the scenes’ use of personal data to target political messages to individuals 
must be transparent and lawful if we are to preserve the integrity of our election process. 
We may never know whether individuals were unknowingly influenced to vote a certain way in 
either the UK EU referendum or the in US election campaigns. But we do know that personal 
privacy rights have been compromised by a number of players and that the digital electoral 
ecosystem needs reform.72
Ms Denham stressed that voluntary initiatives by social media platforms were insufficient to 
address these issues and that ‘a self-regulatory approach will not guarantee consistency, rigour 
or public confidence’. As Section 2 of this report has described, she had good reason not to trust 
any assurances from Facebook that it would address such issues internally: it had given just 
such assurances to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada following an investigation 
she had supervised while working there in 2009 – and had then completely failed to act on 
them.
Ms Denham concluded: ‘This is a global issue, which requires global solutions.’
3.3  Democracy under threat: risks and solutions in the era of disinformation 
and data monopoly. Report of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics of the Canadian Parliament
3.3.1  Background
In March 2018, the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics of the 
Canadian Parliament’s House of Commons began to investigate abuses of personal data 
involving Cambridge Analytica, AggregateIQ and Facebook. It soon realised that these breaches 
were ‘the tip of the iceberg’ and raised ‘broader questions relating to the self-regulation of 
platform monopolies, the use of these platforms for data harvesting purposes, and their role in 
the spreading of disinformation and misinformation around the world’. 
In June 2018, the committee’s interim report noted its concern ‘that the Canadian democratic 
and electoral process is vulnerable to improper acquisition and manipulation of personal data’ 
and made a number of preliminary recommendations regarding Canadian privacy laws. The 
committee’s full report was published in December 2018, and is summarised here.73
On some central aspects – particularly the role of AggregateIQ (AIQ) – the committee coordinated 
its investigation with those being run concurrently by the UK Information Commissioner and the 
UK Parliament’s DCMS Committee (see sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.3 above). Many of its findings 
drew on and/or corroborated those investigations, so this summary will focus in particular on 
the Canadian committee’s findings in regard to the role of Facebook and to problems associated 
with social media companies more generally.
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3.3.2  AggregateIQ and Facebook data
The committee was able to question Zackary Massingham, CEO of AIQ, as well as Jeff Silvester, 
the company’s Chief Operating Officer. They stated ‘that AIQ had no relationship with Cambridge 
Analytica or SCL Group (SCL), that they had never seen evidence that the organisations Vote 
Leave and BeLeave coordinated on the Brexit campaign, and that they were unaware that the 
personal information provided by SCL had been illegally obtained from Facebook’. However, the 
committee found much reason to doubt these assertions, finding their evidence ‘inconsistent, 
full of contradictions and contrary to the testimony of several other reliable witnesses’.
3.3.3  Structural problems in the ‘information ecosystem’
One section of the committee’s report was especially interesting in the light it threw on problems 
that went deeper than the immediate abuses of personal data revealed by the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal.
A number of expert witnesses drew attention to problems in what the committee referred to as 
the ‘information ecosystem’.
Dr Taylor Owen, Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the University of 
British Columbia, explained that ‘developments in social media in recent years have created a 
new structure that determines what is acceptable and sets the boundaries on public debate: the 
platforms’ filtering mechanisms, which decide what people see and whether our content will 
be seen’. He identified two aspects of this digital infrastructure that are especially damaging. 
One is the monetisation of the platforms and their users, which creates a so-called ‘attention 
economy’ that:
‘…requires commercialising our attention and behavioural changes. Platform algorithms 
prioritise entertainment, shock, and radicalisation over reliable information. This is embedded 
in the business model. This is why research shows, for example, that misinformation spreads 
further and faster than genuine news.’
The other was that the experience of social media users is increasingly determined by 
unaccountable AI systems which, when set up to drive revenues by maximising user engagement 
with content, ‘filter the most engaging content to us, to know what will rile us up and engage us, 
to determine what we see as an individual user and whether we are seen and heard inside these 
platforms.’ One result of this is ‘fragmentation and the vulnerability of elections’, as individual 
users are exposed to a constant stream of information ‘designed to reinforce and harden their 
views’. This drives polarisation and is ‘increasingly leading to actual physical manifestations of 
individual and collective violence’. It also creates favourable conditions for foreign governments 
or malign actors wishing to exacerbate social division and influence voter behaviour in other 
countries.
Reinforcing this point, Claire Wardle, of First Draft, a non-profit organisation focused on the 
effects of online media, observed that: ‘The problem is that deceptive content is often what 
generates the strongest reactions and is being promoted’. 
Ben Scott, Director of Policy and Advocacy at the Omidyar Network, said that in the social media 
environment ‘all of the signals about source credibility and quality that we once had begin to 
attenuate […] We’ve lost the normative structure that in the old media environment allowed us 
as citizens to make implicit judgments about source credibility and, when we’re reading digital 
media, to engage in critical thinking.’ 
Tristan Harris, Co-Founder and Executive Director of the Center for Humane Technology, noted 
that: ‘Self-optimising AI systems use algorithms to predict the best content to suggest to a given 
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individual, and the personalisation of user accounts enables billions of people to be targeted by 
personalised forms of manipulation.’ And, as Dr Elizabeth Dubois, a social media expert at the 
University of Ottawa, explained, the way social media algorithms operate is currently a black 
box: ‘We don’t know how Facebook or Google decides what shows up and what doesn’t.’
Like the DCMS committee, Harris called for social media companies to be thought of as publishers 
responsible for the content they promoted, given that this ‘is fuelled by recommendations 
generated by the platforms, using AI that they have programmed’. This would mean that they 
became responsible for the social costs as well as the financial profits of their business model:
‘Right now we have dirty-burning technology companies that use this perverse business model 
that pollutes the social fabric. Just as with coal, we need to make that more expensive, so 
you’re paying for the externalities that show up on society’s balance sheet, whether those are 
polarisation, disinformation, epistemic pollution, mental health issues, loneliness or alienation. 
That has to be on the balance sheets of companies.’
Having heard this and other expert evidence, the committee concluded that:
‘The structural problems inherent in social media platforms serve to fuel the attention economy 
and help in the promotion of disinformation and misinformation to millions of addicted users. 
The Committee is very concerned about the negative externalities these platforms have.’
3.3.4  Transparency in online advertising
Many of the expert witnesses giving evidence to the committee drew attention to the lack of 
transparency as to who is targeting people with political ads online, and why. As Ben Scott put 
it, there is ‘no reason in the world why every citizen who sees a political ad shouldn’t know 
exactly who bought it, how much they spent, and how many people they paid to reach.’ Scott 
also stressed that people exposed to such advertising should know ‘why you got that ad – what 
the demographic features were that were chosen by the advertiser to make that ad come to 
you,’ and suggested that publicly accessible online databases of such advertising would also 
improve transparency, with advertisers and tech platforms legally required to include all such 
ads in these. 
The committee recommended that authorising agents should be legally required to submit 
identification and proof of address when placing political ads online, and that social media 
platforms should be required to create searchable and machine-readable databases of online 
political advertising, including information on who funded the ad; the political issue covered; 
the period during which the ad was online; and the demographics of the target audience. It also 
recommended that paid political advertising should be clearly labelled as such to the social 
media users who are exposed to it.
3.3.5  Algorithmic transparency and responsibility for content
Having heard evidence on the power of algorithms to determine the content delivered to social 
media users, and on the ability of automated tools such as ‘bots’ to deliver disinformation and 
other harmful content, the committee took the firm view that social media platforms should be 
considered as publishers responsible for the content they delivered.
It recommended that such platforms be legally required to clearly label content produced 
automatically or algorithmically; to identify and remove inauthentic and fraudulent accounts 
impersonating others for malicious reasons; and that they should adhere to a code of practice 
that would forbid deceptive or unfair practices. It also recommended imposing a legal duty on 
such platforms to swiftly remove harmful content such as hate speech, defamation, harassment, 
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and incitement to violence ‘or risk monetary sanctions commensurate with the dominance and 
significance of the social platform’.
It also called for Canada to ‘enact transparency requirements with respect to algorithms 
and provide to an existing or a new regulatory body the mandate and the authority to audit 
algorithms’.
The committee stressed that ‘the monetary sanctions imposed by the new proposed legislative 
measures should represent more than the mere cost of doing business for a company’.
 
3.3.6  Regulation of monopoly power
After hearing evidence from Professor Maurice Stucke of the University of Tennessee’s College 
of Law, the committee decided to adopt Professor Stucke’s description of highly dominant 
social data companies such as Facebook as ‘data-opolies’, which he described as companies 
that ‘...control a key platform through which a significant volume and variety of personal data 
flows. The velocity of acquiring and exploiting this personal data can help these companies 
obtain significant market power.’
Professor Stucke stressed that:
‘…the potential harms from data-opolies can exceed those from monopolies. They can affect 
not only our wallets. They can affect our privacy, autonomy, democracy and well-being.’
 
3.3.7  Inadequacy of self-regulation
Canada’s Privacy Commissioner, Daniel Thierren, told the committee that he and his international 
counterparts were alarmed by recent developments:
‘There is a crisis in the collection and processing of personal information online. Even tech 
giants […] are recognising that the status quo cannot continue. Apple CEO Tim Cook spoke 
of ‘a data industrial complex’ and warned that ‘our own information, from the everyday to the 
deeply personal, is being weaponised against us with military efficiency’ […] Facebook’s Mark 
Zuckerberg admitted that his company committed a serious breach of trust in the Cambridge 
Analytica matter. Both companies expressed support for a new U.S. law that would be similar 
to Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR. When the tech giants have become 
outspoken supporters of serious regulation, then you know that the ground has shifted and we 
have reached a crisis point.’
(Any student of Facebook’s history might, however, have advised Mr Thierren not to take 
Zuckerberg’s enthusiasm for regulation at face value.)  
Several expert witnesses emphasised that social media platforms such as Facebook could not 
be relied on to regulate themselves. 
The committee noted that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) offered European 
social media users higher levels of protection than are enjoyed by Canadian citizens, particularly 
with regard to control over how their data is used, and recommended that Canada enact similar 
legislation. 
In its concluding remarks, the committee noted that:
‘… if there is one thing that the events of the past year have brought to light, it is that social 
media platforms should carry out a thorough self-examination, as they have an important 
choice to make. Do they wish to continue with a business model designed to be addictive while 
ignoring the harmful effects their platforms can have on the social fabric, and their long-term 
human impact? Or would they rather make technology more ethical and compatible with the 
capabilities of the human mind? The Committee sincerely hopes that they will choose the latter’.
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While we do not doubt the committee’s sincerity, any expectation that Zuckerberg and his 
fellow tech billionaires will voluntarily ‘choose’ a more ethical path would, we believe, represent 
a triumph of hope over experience. 
F A C E B O O K  T O O L S  F O R  M I C R O TA R G E T I N G  
Facebook provides a number of tools that allow advertisers to define and select 
particular audiences to target. These include ‘Website Custom Audience’, which allows 
advertisers to target Facebook users who have visited their websites (using Facebook Pixel to 
analyse the behaviour of these audiences while on particular sites) and ‘Lookalike Audience’, 
i.e. Facebook users who are likely to be promising targets because their profiles resemble 
those of existing audiences. Lookalike audiences are created using Facebook’s social graph 
data including demographics, social connections and relationships, income, interests and 
newsfeed activity. The granularity that these tools provide has increased greatly along with 
rising data volumes and advances in AI. 
The power of tools to influence users’ behaviour has also increased apace. An example is 
Facebook’s ‘Dynamic Creative’, which enables advertisers to rapidly create huge numbers 
of ads and test multiple variants of these to find those that make most impact on a target 
audience. 
Creating, testing and targeting such ads was one of the things that AIQ was doing for Vote 
Leave and associated groups during the EU referendum campaign. An example is shown 
below: a Facebook ad aimed at people who had shown environmental interests. Others were 
tailored to audiences whose profiles suggested they might be concerned by immigration. 
Vote Leave’s campaign director Dominic Cummings estimates that the campaign ran around 
one billion targeted ads in the run up to the vote, mostly via Facebook.74
One of the ‘dark ads’ produced and targeted for Vote Leave during the EU referendum campaign in 2016.75
Recent analysis by researchers at the University of Southern California has demonstrated 
how Facebook’s audience analysis tools can be used to obtain highly personal information 
not just on particular audiences but on individuals – including their identities – and to run 
Facebook-approved campaigns aimed at single users or households. The researchers 
noted that Facebook’s advertising and data use policies ‘do not prohibit or discourage 
microtargeting’ and that the company’s reaction to being alerted of the ease with which 
individuals can be identified and targeted showed ‘an apathy toward microtargeting and 
circumventions of the rudimentary microtargeting protections Facebook has put in place’ 
and ‘a disregard for the need to limit the ease of targeting marginalised groups’.76
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3.4  Facebook scrutinised by EU parliamentarians
3.4.1  Background
In May 2018, after repeated requests from the EU Parliament, Mark Zuckerberg agreed to 
answer questions in person from leaders of the political groups and the Chair and Rapporteur 
of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. The Brussels hearing was chaired 
by EP President Antonio Tajani and, at the insistence of the EU Parliament’s Green Group, was 
livestreamed. Some observers were critical of the format of the session, noting that it did not 
lend itself well to forensic cross-examination.77 Nevertheless, the hearings and Facebook’s 
subsequent written answers to follow-up questions were instructive, if only for the very public 
demonstration of Zuckerberg’s reluctance to give straight answers.
This was followed up in June and July 2018 by a series of hearings chaired by Claude Moraes and 
Josef Weidenhozer of the EU Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee. 
These gave an opportunity for a number of expert witnesses to give some interesting evidence, 
though the contributions from Facebook executives were somewhat less enlightening.
3.4.2  Zuckerberg vague and evasive
Zuckerberg endeavoured to start his appearance on a contrite note. In a prepared statement, 
he said:
‘Over the last couple of years we haven’t done enough to prevent these tools from being used 
for harm as well: that goes for fake news, foreign interference in elections, and developers 
misusing people’s information. We didn’t take a broad enough view of our responsibility and 
that was a mistake, and I’m sorry for it [...] I want to be clear, keeping people safe will always 
be more important than maximising our profits.’78
Whether from naivety or for other reasons, the Facebook CEO was keen to downplay the political 
motives underlying the abuses of Facebook’s platform, seeking to present these abuses as 
being motivated largely by commercial considerations and amenable to commercial solutions: 
It’s worth noting that a lot of fake news is economically motivated not politically motivated. 
It’s much like email spam in that way: the playbook for fighting this is removing the ways that 
spammers can make money so then they just go and do something else.79
Zuckerberg sought to reassure EU lawmakers that Facebook would be making efforts to 
prevent interference in upcoming elections in Europe: ‘This is one of our top priorities … that 
we prevent anyone from trying to interfere in elections like the Russians were able to do’ [in 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election].80  He was vague on how his company intended to do this, 
but suggested that this would involve use of more artificial intelligence (AI) tools to identify and 
remove fake accounts, as well as closer co-operation with regulators.
Zuckerberg shrugged off questions about Facebook’s monopoly position by downplaying 
Facebook’s dominance:
‘We exist in a very competitive space where people use a lot of tools for communication. The 
average person uses a lot of tools for communication… so from where I sit, it feels like there are 
new competitors coming up every day… We are constantly needing to evolve our services.’81
At the end of the hearing, Zuckerberg, seemingly aware of the inadequacy of many of his 
answers, said: ‘I realise there were a lot of specific questions that I didn’t get to specifically 
answer, but going around and hearing the themes of what people are concerned about, had 
questions about, I think I was able to address the high-level areas in each.’ 82
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At the request of President Tajani, Facebook sent written answers to questions posed by MEPs 
that Zuckerberg had not addressed. These were for the most part equally bland and added little 
to Zuckerberg’s responses, although they did include a commitment to increased transparency 
in political advertising and to a compulsory system of verification for people managing Facebook 
pages with large numbers of followers.83
3.4.3. Expert witnesses shed light on misinformation and data protection issues
Three subsequent hearings heard from a number of witnesses with first-hand experience of the 
ways in which Facebook and political disinformation campaigns operate.
At the first of these, Sandy Parakilas, a former Facebook operations manager who since leaving 
Facebook has become Chief Strategy Officer at the Center for Humane Technology, explained 
that one of his main responsibilities at Facebook had been data protection. He emphasised that 
the company had, until 2014/15, allowed developers to access a vast quantity of user data, 
including (for some developers with ‘extended permissions’) their private messages – and that 
it had allowed this to happen without requiring explicit permission from users. He pointed out 
that even after Facebook had been aware of the abuses of data by Cambridge Analytica, it had 
continued to allow the company to use its platform for advertising until March 2018. 
‘This problem is much, much larger than Facebook or Cambridge Analytica,’ Parakilas said. 
‘Regulating such a complicated industry is going to be extraordinarily challenging. The good 
news is that GDPR is going to be a great first step towards defining rights for users.’ However, 
he stressed that it was important for regulators to ‘ensure comprehension, not just consent’. 
He explained that on Facebook’s Terms of Service consent screen, supposedly compliant with 
GDPR, links to pages on which users can read these terms and see their options ‘are tiny, and 
the button to accept and simply move on without reading anything is very large, so I think it is 
fair to say that this page is designed to get the user to accept’. He also pointed to recent reports 
detailing how device manufacturers had been able to access Facebook user data despite the 
protections supposedly in place to prevent this. 
Parakilas suggested that it is crucial to find ‘ways to align corporate and user incentives’. 
Drawing a parallel with the insurance industry, he pointed out that the fact that insurers had 
to pay out claims whenever a driver was injured had led to the industry caring greatly about 
passenger safety. He suggested that leveraging a ‘cyber-insurance’ industry could have 
similar effects in the online world and help ensure that companies and users are educated to 
become more aware of best practices, while spreading the risk of large penalties out across 
many companies. However, he emphasised that ‘rules alone will not work’ – the companies 
themselves need to provide users with easy-to-use tools to control usage of their own data. He 
also stressed that regulation should not curb small companies that drive innovation: ‘We do not 
want to further empower entrenched monopolies through regulation.’
Questioned about whether Facebook was moving user data belonging to non-EU citizens out 
of the EU in order evade GDPR requirements, Parakilas said that Facebook’s approach was 
neither ‘in the spirit of GDPR nor in the spirit of what they have described, which is to apply 
the protections of GDPR globally. I think were they truly to act in that spirit they would not have 
moved those accounts.’ 
Parakilas commented on the ‘echo chamber’ effect that allowed misinformation to spread 
unchallenged within certain user communities that Facebook’s algorithms help to create, 
observing that the key to tackling this problem was to make such algorithms more transparent. 
He acknowledged that Facebook had started to make efforts to achieve greater transparency 
in political advertising, but stressed that the real problem was with the company’s ‘surveillance 
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advertising’ business model, which ‘creates some really dangerous incentives that are bad for 
society’:
‘There are two approaches we can take. We can either highly regulate all of the worst cases, for 
example foreign actors interfering in elections, and we can write a bunch of really complicated 
rules about how that should or should not happen. Or we could simply remove some of the 
functionality, so that there is less targeting capability, so that it’s harder to do the kinds of things 
that happened in Brexit and in the US presidential election. Those are the two basic approaches. 
As regulators, I would encourage you where possible to try to avoid highly specific rules if you 
can avoid it. If you can try to think about ecosystems and incentives, and wherever you can try 
to find other actors like I mentioned with the insurance companies – try to find other players in 
the ecosystem who can provide balance.’
Parakilas also stressed Facebook’s highly dominant position in the social media market, the way 
it has used this to suppress potential competitors such as Snapchat, and the need to prevent 
data-sharing between Facebook and other platforms under its control such as WhatsApp and 
Instagram. 
Observer journalist Carole Cadwalladr described ongoing investigations into the 2016 EU 
referendum in the UK (as detailed in earlier sections of this report). She said that these had 
helped demonstrate that the current laws surrounding campaigning no longer work: 
‘Everything is running through the black boxes of the tech companies, and we have no idea of 
what is going on inside those black boxes. What this means, critically, is that we have no idea 
how much money was spent during the referendum. We don’t know who spent it. We don’t 
know where that money came from. We don’t know what advertisements people saw. We don’t 
know how people were targeted with those advertisements. We don’t know what data that was 
based upon…We have this situation now where we have a foreign company that played an 
absolutely pivotal role in that referendum and we have no means of obtaining that information.’
Cadwalladr described how journalists seeking answers from Facebook had been stonewalled 
and intimidated by threats of legal action by the company. She also described how Facebook 
had obstructed attempts to discover the extent of efforts by Russian actors to influence UK 
voters, and deplored the failure of British politicians – some of whom, she said, were directly 
implicated in some of the abuses that took place around the 2016 referendum – to take action. 
She said that the EU is the ‘one institution that has the authority to stand up to the tech giants 
[…] I really hope that you will hold them to account.’
UK ICO Elizabeth Denham and her deputy, James Dipple-Johnson, updated the hearing on 
their ongoing investigation into the Cambridge Analytica scandal. Ms Denham emphasised 
that ‘the behavioural advertising ecosystem has been applied across political campaigns to 
influence how we may vote, and I am deeply concerned at how this has happened without due 
legal or ethical considerations about the impacts to our democratic system.’ She also hailed 
the progress in data protection made by the EU, and noted that ‘online platforms are data 
controllers under data protection law, and they can be held fully liable for misuse of personal 
data on their platforms.’ 
Pointing out the way in which online platforms and their algorithms control the content that 
users see, Denham stressed that ‘they must take responsibility for the provenance of the 
information that is provided to users’. In response to questions, she acknowledged that similar 
abuses were happening on other, smaller platforms, but that ‘Facebook is a very big player in 
this field and is the focus of misuse that has been identified in the UK.’
Mr Dipple-Johnson stressed that the new powers that the UK ICO now enjoyed via GDPR had 
been enormously helpful in allowing it to understand and pursue the data abuses that had taken 
place. 
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Asked how data protection authorities could ensure that upcoming European elections would 
not be affected by similar abuses to those that had been identified in the UK and US, Ms 
Denham said that, under GDPR, inspection of algorithms and orders to stop processing data 
would be as effective as administrative fines.
Professor David Carroll, a US academic, described how he had used a Subject Access Request 
(SAR) under EU law to attempt to obtain his personal data from Cambridge Analytica/SCL, after 
discovering that this had been processed in the UK, and the ways in which the company had 
prevented him from obtaining it. His interest was more than personal –  Carroll said he wished 
to find if this data had been used, in combination with psychological profiling, to expose him 
to malicious information designed to influence his vote in the US presidential election: ‘We 
can understand that their model has the potential to affect a population – even if it’s just 
a tiny slice of the population – because in the US only about 70,000 voters in three states 
decided the election.’ He observed that: ‘Unless these political technology machines are built 
on fundamental rights of access and privacy by design, it strains credulity that democracy can 
survive uninjured.’
Cambridge Analytica whistleblower Christopher Wylie detailed his experience of the ways in 
which the firm had acted as ‘a corrupting force’ in political campaigns in various countries 
around the world. In particular he described ‘Project Ripon’, whose purpose was ‘to develop 
and scale psychological profiling algorithms for use on political campaigns’. (see section 3.1.3 
above). Wylie emphasised that: 
‘The work of Cambridge Analytica was not equivalent to traditional marketing, as has been 
claimed by some…Cambridge Analytica specialised in disinformation, spreading rumours, 
kompromat and propaganda. CA sought to identify certain mental and emotional vulnerabilities 
in certain subsets of the population and worked to exploit those vulnerabilities by targeting 
information designed to activate some of the worst characteristics in people, such as 
neuroticism, paranoia and racial biases.’ 
Wylie claimed that Facebook had approved the terms and conditions of the app used to harvest 
user data that was used as input for these algorithms without even reading these. He said that 
AIQ had illegally shared data between supposedly separate Leave campaigns during the EU 
referendum campaign, and that Vote Leave had then attempted to cover this up by removing 
evidence. He observed: 
‘I do not believe Brexit would have happened were it not for the data technologies and network 
of actors set up by Cambridge Analytica. I also do not believe that the Brexit result was won 
fairly or legitimately […] Facebook’s system allowed this to happen, and Mark Zuckerberg’s 
refusal to answer key questions has prevented us from finding out everything that happened 
during Brexit […] The EU has a right and an obligation to know whether millions of people will 
be losing their rights as European citizens on the basis of a flawed vote corrupted by systemic 
electoral fraud and data crime.’
Wylie also described how he had been banned from both Facebook and Instagram after the 
revelations he had made:
‘Banning a whistleblower reveals the unrestrained power technology companies have over 
users, when a person’s online presence can be so quickly and so thoroughly eliminated from 
existence […] What happens to our democracy when these companies can so easily delete 
people who dissent, scrutinise or speak out?’
At the hearing of 26 June, Angela Jelinek, Chair of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), 
said that the EDPB already had 29 cross-border cases, and that the Facebook/Cambridge 
Analytica case was just ‘the tip of the iceberg’. She said that awareness of the issues it raised 
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was increasing in the US and elsewhere, with signs that other countries were interested in 
moving towards similar levels of data protection. Asked what was being done to prevent future 
such abuses, she said that national data authorities had increased their staff numbers, though 
not all had sufficient staff, and that it was important to make sure that there was a lead authority 
with a responsibility to take the lead and coordinate efforts by other authorities. She stressed 
that the EDPB was making efforts to achieve convergence in the approaches taken by these 
authorities, and that the different national regulators were working closely together on this. 
Paul Dehaye of data protection organisation Personaldata.io described his attempts to use SARs 
to get information on the data Facebook held on him, and on the way this data had been used 
in targeted advertising, noting that Facebook had persistently failed to provide this and brushed 
off his complaints, and that subsequent evidence given by Facebook executives had run directly 
counter to his own experience. He said Facebook had shown a ‘sustained disregard for European 
laws regarding data protection’ and described the company as ‘basically Cambridge Analytica 
with better PR, better lawyers and even better lobbying’.
Dehaye called for enforcement of the right to portability of user data between platforms, saying 
that Facebook Pixel data, for instance, could be imported into systems that would offer users 
and researchers more insight into how this data is actually used to influence users’ behaviour. 
He said such innovations could help ‘to rebalance power within the personal data ecosystem’ 
but that they are being ‘actively stunted by Facebook’, which is ‘clinging to an outdated business 
model’. He also cautioned that data portability opens up new questions as to user privacy and 
fair competition, which authorities would need to consider. 
Steve Satterfield, Director of Privacy and Public Policy at Facebook, told the hearing that 
Facebook was making efforts to give users more insight into the apps that had access to their 
data, through initiatives such as ‘Clear History’; that it was continuing to investigate abuses 
by such apps; and that it had made major efforts to make the platform fully GDPR-compliant. 
He said that Facebook was now requesting users’ explicit consent for specific types of data 
processing. He also claimed that ‘advertising and privacy are not in conflict’ and said that 
users could control the types of advertising they see, find out how they have been selected 
for specific types of advertising, and opt out of particular types of ad. According to Satterfield, 
the Cambridge Analytica scandal and the introduction of GDPR had prompted the company to 
reconsider the ways in which in which its developer platform works and given ‘further impetus 
to consider the ways in which we’re protecting data across all of our services’.
Under questioning, Satterfield gave vague answers on exactly how Cambridge Analytica had 
used Facebook and associated platforms to target voters with political advertising. He claimed 
that ‘to the best information we have, Cambridge Analytica didn’t receive information from 
European users’. He also claimed that the abuses of personal data by Aleksandr Kogan and 
Cambridge Analytica ran counter to Facebook policies of the time. 
Asked what could be done to prevent abuse of Facebook tools during electoral campaigns, 
Satterfield said that efforts were focused on tamping down on fake accounts, using automated 
AI tools. He said the company was using third-party factcheckers to clamp down on fake news 
and that its new ‘View Ads’ feature would allow users to see all of the ads that were put 
out by a particular page. Asked whether the company would submit to an independent audit 
of its data practices, Satterfield said that the company was regularly audited by regulators 
such as the Irish Data Protection Commissioner and the FTC in the US. When asked to explain 
why Facebook had moved users out of European jurisdiction to the US, he said that the same 
user controls were effective worldwide. In response to questioning, Satterfield confirmed that 
Facebook gathers data on non-users, including unique identifiers (IP addresses), from sites that 
use Facebook features, but claimed that the uses to which it put these data were ‘very limited’.
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Claire Bassett, head of the UK Electoral Commission, described how digital campaigning had 
some positive impact by involving more people in public debate around elections, but said that 
electoral rules needed to be improved to increase accountability of political advertising and 
transparency as to how money is spent on such advertising, and who is spending it. She said 
that a register of all political advertising would be very helpful in achieving this, allowing greater 
transparency and insight for both regulators and the public. She also said that having stronger 
sanctions available would help regulators enforce regulation more effectively. 
Joel Kaplan, Facebook’s Vice President of Global Public Policy, acknowledged that Facebook 
had been used by malign actors to undermine elections around the world, and claimed that it 
had ‘learned important lessons’. He said the company has successfully deployed new tools in 
recent European elections and was making significant efforts to combat foreign interference, 
crack down on fake accounts, reduce the spread of false news, increase the transparency of 
ads, and support an informed electorate. 
He claimed that advances in machine learning and AI were enabling the company to detect 
misinformation emanating from foreign sources and detect fake accounts, and that Facebook 
was now showing fewer stories with inauthentic content, thanks to more fact-checking, 
partnerships with external partners, and changes to algorithms that downgraded sensational 
‘clickbait’ content. He also claimed that Facebook’s ‘View Ads’ feature would make the 
sources and targeting of such ads more transparent to users. Kaplan stressed that Facebook 
was partnering with civil society organisations, regulators and academics to increase public 
participations in elections, and to gain a better understanding of how social media were used 
around electoral campaign. He said that Facebook was setting up teams ahead of each national 
elections to bring such tools to bear as appropriate to the particular circumstances.
Asked why Facebook had refused to hand over information to the UK Parliament to enable 
a judgement to be made on whether the Brexit referendum had been conducted fairly and 
lawfully, and whether the company was prepared to hand over such information in regard to 
future elections, Kaplan claimed that the company had answered ‘a tremendous quantity of 
questions’, and that when it comes to providing retrospective information, ‘that’s not something 
we can do consistent with prior commitments to people’s privacy’. In effect, he was admitting 
that the privacy of potentially malign actors was more important to the company than the 
integrity of the electoral process around a crucially important referendum.
Privacy rights campaigner Max Schrems outlined his efforts over the past seven years to hold 
Facebook to account, and what he saw as the failure of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner 
to take effective action on the issues he had raised. Like other witnesses, he saw effective 
enforcement of GDPR as the key to forcing the company to show proper respect for user data. 
He noted what he described as a fundamental market failure – ‘We have a lot of people who hate 
Facebook but they don’t have any other option’ – and expressed the hope that anti-monopoly 
action by the EU would help to change this situation. 
For Facebook, Richard Allan, the company’s Vice President of Public Policy, reprised his 
performance at the UK Parliament’s DCMS committee, claiming that there are ‘different opinions 
on concepts like consent and so on’. He claimed that the changes the company had made 
were more than cosmetic, and that Facebook had significantly reduced the access that app 
developers can have to personal data. In regard to fake news he observed that ‘one person’s 
fake news is another person’s political speech’ and added no significant further detail on how 
the company is attempting to combat the problem. 
Allan once again stressed that advertising was what enabled the platform to offer its services 
to users for free, but echoed Kaplan’s claim that Facebook is making its advertising more 
transparent, saying: ‘It is certainly not in our interests or in the interest of consumer trust 
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to have poor quality or misleading ads shown on our system.’ On verifying the identity of 
Facebook users – a key issue in controlling the spread of misinformation by malign actors 
–Allan remarked: ‘We have not been persuaded to date that the collection of significant extra 
amounts of sensitive information in order to verify someone’s identity would be justified.’
At the third hearing, chaired by MEP Josef Weidenhozer of the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs Committee, parliamentarians had been hoping to hear from Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook’s 
Chief Operations Officer. In a letter to Mark Zuckerberg, Chair of the Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs Committee Claude Moraes had expressed his frustration with Facebook’s 
reluctance to allow the EU Parliament to question its most senior decision-making executives: 
‘I would like to stress it is essential for Facebook’s credibility to show its commitment that you 
send staff members that are in charge of the departments concerned in your company and not 
public policy team members.’84
Instead, the company sent Richard Allan, who once again gave a series of bland apologies and 
assurances, without offering much in the way of new information. He described, somewhat 
vaguely, how ‘we are working on a number of solutions to try and stem the spread of false news,’ 
and mentioned the code of practice in relation to this on which the company had been working 
with the EU Commission. Again, he reiterated the company’s ‘strong sense of responsibility to 
reduce harm when we can,’ while acknowledging that ‘we have been slow to start’ on issues 
such as hate speech.’ Parliamentarians seeking more concrete information to add to that given 
at the previous two hearings were largely disappointed.
Following the hearing, Civil Liberties Committee Chair Claude Moraes said:
‘In the course of our investigation, it has become clear that real transparency is needed from 
companies such as Facebook in terms of data processing methods, tracking, profiling and use 
of algorithms in order to ensure consumer trust. My impression is that much needs to be done, 
particularly by commercial organisations, to ensure that their business model is by design and 
by default compliant with fundamental rights. After hearing from the competent authorities 
examining the case, we expect appropriate measures to enforce the law and ensure the respect 
of our fundamental rights will be taken.’ 85
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4.0  Policy recommendations
 
This report and the findings of the expert bodies that it has referenced have demonstrated 
beyond reasonable doubt that a massively dominant social media platform such as 
Facebook cannot be trusted to regulate itself. Time and again, Facebook has responded to 
findings that it has committed serious breaches of the trust that its users place in it by saying 
that it will tackle these problems internally. Time and again, it has failed to do so, and the 
abuses have only multiplied as Facebook’s global scale has grown. 
These problems stem both from the company’s ethos and from its basic business model, 
which has been to trade access to user data for opportunities to raise revenue, and to use the 
content it delivers as a means to stimulate user engagement, with little regard for its impact 
on individual users or whole societies. While tinkering around the edges of this model and 
introducing cosmetic changes in the hope of pacifying its critics, Facebook shows no sign of 
moving to a significantly different modus operandi and nor do we expect it to do so voluntarily.
As all three investigating bodies have found, Facebook has determinedly resisted attempts 
to gain a true picture of the scale of the problem. Such information as they have managed to 
obtain has had to be dragged out of the company, and its attitude to these investigations has 
been characterised at every stage by obfuscation or outright contempt. Meanwhile, as recent 
events in France have shown all too clearly, its platform continues to facilitate weaponised 
disinformation that is causing deepening social divisions and actual violence. This cannot be 
allowed to continue – least of all at a time when many countries, not least the UK, are facing 
crucial political decisions that will affect people’s lives for generations to come.
Legal authorities in various countries finally appear to be taking a tougher approach to holding 
Facebook to account, using existing national and international laws.86 Yet effective regulation 
poses formidable challenges, not least the need to protect the freedom of speech and of 
expression that are also essential to a fully engaged democracy. Facebook and other tech giants 
operate globally and the abuses that have taken place all have an international dimension. All 
three bodies whose reports we have covered recognise this, and it is encouraging to see them 
working together on possible solutions.
Our proposals draw on the recommendations of these three reports, and on those made recently 
by the EU Commission and EU parliamentarians. They are aimed not just at curbing the sort of 
abuses that we have described, but also at helping to foster the development of truly social (as 
opposed to anti-social) media.
4.1  User control over data
The most coherent transnational approach to addressing abuses of personal data has been 
taken by the European Union. On 25 May 2018 the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) came into force. It gives the data-protection authorities in EU countries far more power 
to penalise Facebook and other tech companies for breaches than were previously available 
under the Data Protection Directive that formerly applied – including the power to impose much 
higher fines.
The user rights that GDPR underpins all have major implications for the way in which Facebook 
operates. For instance, the Right to Be Informed specifies that anything that happens to such 
data must be disclosed to users, and the Right to Object means that users must explicitly give 
consent before any data is used in a particular way – and be able to withdraw this consent as 
easily as it is given. The Right to Data Portability states that an organisation must always give 
86  In December 2018, for example, 
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its users the ability to see all the data it holds on them. These rights mean, for instance, that 
companies using Facebook’s Pixel system to track website users for the purpose of targeting 
ads now have to gain the specific consent of users before monitoring their activity on their sites.
Several cases under GDPR are already being brought against Facebook in EU countries, for 
instance in regard to the recent incident that saw the personal data of some five million EU 
citizens compromised by a software vulnerability. If the company is found in breach over this 
incident, it could be fined up to €20 million or 4% of its annual global turnover, whichever is 
higher. On the basis of Facebook’s reported results for the last fiscal year, this means that 
it could in theory face a fine of up to $1.63 billion.87 The UK Information Commissioner has 
already issued its first GDPR notice against AggregateIQ, the Canadian company that featured 
in the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica data scandal.
Following Mark Zuckerberg’s appearance before Members of the European Parliament in May 
2018 – an appearance notable for the way in which Facebook’s CEO evaded giving direct 
answers to questions – MEPs urged Facebook to allow EU bodies to carry out a full audit 
to assess data protection and security of users’ personal data.88 We agree, but believe that 
additional measures are needed.
GDPR is still in its early days, and although it greatly extends protection for individuals within 
EU countries, the global nature of data transfer and processing by Facebook and other tech 
companies means that, as expert legal commentators have noted:
‘In order to effectively enforce the GDPR’s extraterritorial scope, there will be a need for certain 
level of cooperation between EU and non-EU actors – formal, for example, through development 
of […] agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance by the states, and informal, based, for example, 
on codes of conducts or voluntary compliance by companies operating online.’ 89
We would propose that:
• Countries considering the tightening up of their data protection laws use GDPR as a model 
framework, and work closely with EU authorities on framing such new national legislation. 
This would make the task of holding tech companies such as Facebook to account across 
different national jurisdictions much easier. If the UK does indeed leave the EU, it too should 
take this approach. The UK government has indicated90  that ‘there will be no immediate 
change in the UK’s own data protection standards,’ but we would urge an ongoing 
commitment to fully match and comply with GDPR standards.
•  Penalties specified in national legislation thus developed should be commensurate with 
those under GDPR, and should represent much more than the mere ‘cost of business’ for 
Facebook and other such companies;
•  The EU’s GDPR and comparable legislation in non-EU jurisdictions should eventually be 
framed/revised so that companies basing any part of their data operations in countries that 
are not covered by such legislation are deemed to be automatically in breach. Otherwise, it 
is likely that Facebook and other companies will use laxer legislation in such jurisdictions to 
evade transparency and other legal requirements.
4.2  Disinformation and political advertising
In September 2018, the European Commission published its Code of Practice on Disinformation. 
Several online platforms, including Facebook, have signed the Code, which commits them to 
‘a wide range of commitments, from transparency in political advertising to the closure of fake 
accounts and demonetisation of purveyors of disinformation’.91 These are, rightly, aimed at 
ensuring that social media users exposed to political advertising are able to see who has targeted 
87  ‘Facebook could face $1.63bn 
fine under GDPR over latest data 
breach’, Charlie Osborne, ZDNet, 
2 October 2018.
88  ‘Facebook-Cambridge Analytica: 
MEPs demand action to protect 
citizens’ privacy’, press release, 
European Parliament, 25 October 
2018.
89  ‘Expanding the European data 
protection scope beyond territory: 
Article 3 of the General Data 
Protection Regulation in its wider 
context’, Paul de Hert and Michal 
Czerniawski, International Data 
Privacy Law, Volume 6, Issue 3, 1 
August 2016.
90  ‘Brexit, GDPR and data 
protection: what happens if the 
UK becomes a third country?’, 
Data Protection Network, 
September 2018.
91  Code of Practice on 
Disinformation, European 
Commission, 26 September 
2016,
45
them and who has paid for such ads. As part of their commitment to the Code, signatories have 
also committed to report on the implementation, functioning and effectiveness of the Code, 
based on annual self-assessment reports that will be reviewed by an objective third-party 
organisation, and to provide information to the Commission upon request. As the Commission 
has noted: ‘The Code and other initiatives set forth by the Commission are essential steps in 
ensuring transparent, fair and trustworthy online campaign activities ahead of the European 
elections in spring 2019.’
We welcome this development and see the international adoption of the Code as an essential 
part of any policy aimed at curbing the ongoing damage to democratic institutions caused by 
Facebook and other tech giants. However, Facebook’s long history of obfuscation and deceit 
makes it hard to believe that the self-assessment system on which the Code relies is by any 
means sufficient to ensure that it (or other signatories) will in fact follow the letter and spirit 
of the Code, or report their activities honestly. The Code itself is also worded in a way that 
makes adherence to its principles merely desirable, rather than necessary. It is also worrying, 
in the light of the multiple recent and historical abuses detailed in this report, that a number 
of Facebook policies related to false news, advertising and misrepresentation are held up as 
examples of ‘best practice’.92 We therefore propose that:
•  The EU should devise new legislation to make adherence to the Code a legal requirement for 
social media firms, specifying heavy penalties for any breaches of its terms – and for any 
attempts to conceal such breaches;
•  The Code itself be tightened up to define more precisely what is required of its signatories.
We note, for instance, that signatories to the Code ‘commit to enable public disclosure of 
political advertising (defined as advertisements advocating for or against the election of a 
candidate or passage of referenda in national and European elections), which could include 
actual sponsor identity and amounts spent’. For the purposes of transparency, this is indeed 
absolutely necessary. However, the Code gives no detail as to how this should be done. We 
therefore propose that it be amended to specify that:
•  All signatories should place all political advertisements that are run on their platforms in 
easily searchable databases to which both regulators and members of the public have 
access, and that the information included with these should include the sponsor of the 
advertising, the amount spent on the ad and the basis on which any targeting was carried 
out (e.g., in Facebook’s case, full data relating to any ‘Website Custom Audience’, ‘Lookalike 
Audience’ or similar tools used).
•  During political campaigns ahead of elections or referenda, all political advertising – whether 
from parties or non-party campaigning organisations – should be labelled as such and all 
such parties and campaigners should be required to register with Facebook and other social 
media platforms that they use. Political opinions expressed by (verified) individuals would of 
course be exempt, but the views of organisations or companies, if political, should have a 
clearly identified source.93
•  That users of social media platforms are easily able to opt out of all political advertising and 
that an opt-out link enabling them to do this should be included prominently with all political 
ads.
•  Political advertising related to elections and referenda in particular countries but that 
originates from and/or is paid for by sources from outside these countries should be banned 
under the Code.94:
We also note that the Code does not fully address a closely related problem: the use of false 
identities to disseminate misinformation, not as advertising but as ‘organic’ posts – which 
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are often far more difficult for users to detect as being intended to influence their behaviour. 
While the Code states that ‘relevant Signatories commit to put in place clear policies regarding 
identity and the misuse of automated bots’ it does not give any detail as to what such policies 
should comprise. We propose that:
•  The Code be amended to specify clear requirements on identity verification and the prohibition 
of automated posts by non-human agents. Social media companies should be required to 
verify the identities of all their users before accepting them onto their platforms,. These 
should be made available to relevant authorities following up on allegations of dissemination 
of misinformation or other damaging materials, making those using social media channels 
accountable for their communications. 
•  Personal social media accounts should always be clearly linked to accountable people, who 
should be limited in the number of such accounts they can hold. Pages should be linked to 
legally founded organisations or associations with responsible (named) people behind them. 
We see such measures as the only way to ensure transparency and legal accountability for 
messages promoted on social media platforms. Social media companies should have the same 
level of responsibility as publishers, and only by measures such as these will they be made to 
do so.
4.3  Curbing monopoly power and fostering a healthier social media ecosystem
This is probably the most challenging area for policymakers. Facebook’s global dominance and 
vast user base give it an enormous advantage over any – perhaps more socially responsible 
– competitors in the social media arena, and the company has used its massive resources 
from advertising revenues to bolster this position, often by buying up any promising looking 
newcomers to what it sees as its territory. For users of any social media network, the size of the 
network itself is naturally seen as one of its main strengths: the more users it has with whom 
to make potential connections, the more potentially valuable it is to any individual user. And 
however sceptical we may be of the hollow rhetoric of inclusivity that Zuckerberg has used to 
disguise the true nature of his company’s operations, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
Facebook does indeed offer real benefits to its users and could potentially help us to build the 
global village that many have long dreamed of. 
Moreover, it is principally the users of Facebook who create its value as a social network – value 
in the shape of the human connections and interactions that it enables, but also its market 
value as a mechanism for delivering advertising. Yet the interests of these users – who should 
be seen as the organisation’s most important stakeholder group by far – have been routinely 
ignored and indeed actively damaged by the company’s activities. Rather than being respected 
as stakeholders, they have been treated as ‘inventory’ to be exploited purely for the financial 
gain of Facebook’s owners. Moreover, as Germany’s Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) 
has found, Facebook has abused its dominant market position ‘by making the use of its social 
network conditional on its being allowed to limitlessly amass every kind of data generated by 
using third-party websites and merge it with the user’s Facebook account.’ 95
Various suggestions have been made as to how users’ interests could be better protected and 
represented in the way the company operates and is structured. By analogy with the treatment 
of industrial monopolies and especially natural monopolies, we might consider nationalisation, 
along the lines of historical nationalisations of transport, water and energy utilities But this 
seems at present a remote prospect, given the global nature of Facebook’s operations and the 
fact that it is based in a country that is likely to look askance at any such proposals. And while 
power of the sort that Facebook exercises over people’s personal data is clearly not safe in 
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the hands of its current ownership, there could also be real risks in placing such power at the 
disposal of national governments. 
Some commentators have suggested that the solution lies in giving users fuller control of their 
data, for example by establishing a publicly controlled central infrastructure for the storage 
and exchange of personal data, with individual users deciding what elements of their data are 
stored in this way and to what uses these can be put by specified third parties such as social 
media companies.96 However, in addition to the technical challenges that this presents, it could 
be seen as simply deferring the problem, if such third parties cannot be trusted to use data 
licensed to them in this way responsibly. 
Another, more market-based, solution to giving users more control has been suggested: for 
personal data to be treated  – as The Economist has put it – as ‘the currency in which customers 
actually buy services’ and for laws to be drawn up, analogous to intellectual property laws, ‘to 
govern the ownership and exchange of data, with the aim of giving solid rights to individuals’.97 
The idea is that regulators would oblige tech companies to share with rival firms – and with the 
permission of the users themselves – the data they hold, in exchange for a fee, thus encouraging 
more competition between such firms and loosening the monopoly grip of companies such 
as Facebook. By enabling portability of data between platforms, such proposals might, in 
combination with stricter application of existing anti-monopoly laws, succeed in levelling the 
corporate playing field to some extent, but they too fail to address the central problem, which 
is one of trust and accountability.
Other commentators have suggested that Facebook turn itself into a mutually owned company 
controlled by a trust that is operated in the interests of the organisation’s users and employees.98 
We see this as a solution that would indeed address the core problem, but given the track 
record of its owners it does not appear to be one that will materialise without a clear direction 
being set by lawmakers.
In view of this, we propose that national governments and regulators, working with transnational 
authorities, consider legislation that requires:
•  Users of social media networks to be treated as core stakeholders who should be represented 
both in the ownership of the company and at board level. This could also potentially be a 
requirement of an internationally applied code of practice. 
Since user data is the most valuable asset of a social network such as Facebook, and the 
ultimate driver of its revenue, we would propose that: 
•  Every verified user of a social network owned either by a publicly traded company or a 
private limited company be granted a share that carries voting rights in the company. 
In Facebook’s case, this would entail the transfer of a substantial part of the company’s value to 
its users – something which we believe to be entirely justified by the fact that Facebook’s value 
as a social network derives precisely from these users. It would also mean that Zuckerberg 
would lose his controlling interest in the company – and that too would be seen by many as a 
major step in the right direction.99 
Having voting rights would enable users, as a block, to gain a powerful say over the direction of 
the organisation, and having a board-level representative, chosen by users themselves, would 
help ensure that their interests were treated with the respect they deserve. 
We believe that a strictly enforced international code of practice for social media companies as 
outlined above could do much to prevent abuses such as this report has described. However, 
we also believe, in view of the company’s track record, that Facebook is likely to resist such 
proposals and/or attempt to circumvent any regulation that it sees as threatening to its current 
96  For a well-developed proposal 
along these lines, see The 
Digital Commonwealth: From 
private enclosure to collective 
benefit, Mathew Lawrence and 
Laurie Laybourn-Langtone, 
IPPR Commission on Economic 
Justice, 2018.
97  ‘How to tame the tech titans’, The 
Economist, 18 January 2018.
98  ‘An open letter to Mark 
Zuckerberg: It’s time to give 
Facebook to its users’, Molly 
Scott Cato, Left Foot Forward, 21 
March 2018. 
99  In 2009, after Facebook users 
objected to changes in the 
company’s terms and conditions, 
Zuckerberg suggested that 
Facebook would move to give 
users a say over the direction of 
the company by establishing a 
‘user council’ and enabling users 
to vote on major changes. Like so 
many of his statements, this was 
not translated into meaningful 
action. See ‘Facebook lets users 
set its terms and conditions’, 
Mark Harris, TechRadar, 26 
February 2009.
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business model. Proposals to make its governance more inclusive and accountable are also 
likely to meet stiff resistance from Facebook, and in this it may find support from the system of 
corporate law under which it currently operates in the US. In view of this, and taking account of 
the utility nature of a company such as Facebook, we propose that:
•  National governments, including that of the UK, set up dedicated regulatory bodies equivalent 
to existing regulators that oversee the behaviour of the print and broadcast media and the 
energy utility industries. A national social media regulator would be responsible for ensuring 
that platforms adhere to regulations and codes of practice as described above, with powers 
to impose heavy fines for breaches and, ultimately, the power to withdraw an offending 
company’s licence to operate.100
Finally, we believe it is vital to support the development of more socially responsible social 
media organisations and enable these to develop into viable alternatives to Facebook and 
similar commercially oriented companies. This needs to be a central focus of government 
policy, and it requires substantial public investment.101 Enabling such investment is the aim of 
our final proposal.
As we have noted, to be effective the financial penalties for any regulatory breaches should 
represent a substantial proportion of the offending company’s revenues. Our final proposal is 
that:
•  The money raised from penalties imposed by regulators on companies such as Facebook 
should be earmarked for funding of:
 a) Grants to not-for-profit organisations developing social media networks that offer genuine 
benefits for their users and take a transparent and responsible attitude to user data, and that 
are under the control of fully accountable trusts;
 b) Funding for projects aimed at counteracting the spread of disinformation online.
       
100 Ofcom, the UK media and 
telecoms regulator, outlined 
a blueprint for social media 
regulation in September 2018 
– see ‘Ofcom outlines case 
for regulating social media 
networks’.Aliya Ram and Nic 
Fildes, The Financial Times, 18 
September 2018. One possibility 
in the UK would certainly be for 
Ofcom to assume responsibility 
for such oversight, but we would 
suggest a dedicated social media 
regulator would be more suited 
to this large and technically 
specialised role.
101 For a detailed proposal as to how 
this might work in practice, see 
The Digital Commonwealth: From 
private enclosure to collective 
benefit, Mathew Lawrence and 
Laurie Laybourn-Langtone, 




If one were starting from scratch in devising a social media network that offered the 
greatest possible benefits to its users and the fullest respect for their interests, one 
would certainly not be starting from a model that looked anything like Facebook today. 
But that is not to say that we should simply accept that Facebook is the only possible model for 
the future of such networks. 
An interesting comparison is with Wikimedia, a not-for-profit organisation that is run by and for 
its users and is funded by public contributions and grants. Its main project, Wikipedia, has been 
hugely successful in making reliable information easily available to billions of users around 
the world, using free, open-source software. It is, in fact, a shining example of ‘commons-
based peer production’ of the sort that Yochai Benkler and Helen Nissenbaum foresaw in 2006, 
and there is no reason why social media networks run in the same spirit should not also be 
successfully developed. 
We hope that this report has left its readers under no illusions as to the scale of the threat 
that Facebook currently represents to democracy and civil society worldwide. As EU countries 
face an upsurge in far-right populist movements, with imminent elections to the European 
Parliament and a very real possibility of a second referendum on Brexit in the UK, this is a threat 
that calls for immediate action.
Facebook has consistently lied and dissembled to both its users and to regulators, and there is 
little reason to suppose that it will change its ways voluntarily. Much damage has already been 
done, and unless urgent action is taken by governments and regulators, this is likely to get very 
much worse
The proposals we have outlined above may help to steer Facebook in a more positive direction 
and limit the harm it is currently causing to users, democratic institutions and whole societies. 
But we should not assume that the future of social media networking will or should be dominated 
by Facebook or other profit-oriented corporations. 
This moment of crisis is also one of opportunity. Working together, national governments, 
transnational authorities and regulators have it within their power to curb the abuses we have 
described and to create the conditions for a healthier social media ecosystem to develop. 
It is critical that they do not fail in these tasks.
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